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In this thesis, Glenn Harden argues that the fundamental characteristic of evil is
its de-meaning quality. In his reflections on the sex trade and other evils, he
shows how the de-meaning quality of evil poses the gravest existential threat, in
part through constraints to freedom and deception. The Christian task of
theodicy is made more difficult because the de-meaning nature of evil constrains
God's conduct as well. But, for all the difficulties evil poses for people of faith,
traditional, orthodox Christianity offers the most hope for grounding opposition
to evil. Atheists must either deny evil or deny hope; moreover, they cannot
explain healing in face of horrendous evil. Some feminist proposals also fail to
take evil seriously enough by minimizing our own culpability and offering little
hope for the future healing of the world. Finally, efforts by some in the academy
to redefine prostitution as sex work also fail to grapple adequately with the de
meaning nature of evil in the sex trade. While Christians have much to learn
from alternative salvation narratives, the gospel is still the best hope for victims
of great evil.
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As theologian Kenneth Surin noted, all discussions of evil are historically
situated, and my work is no different.^ The reader should know that I write as an
American man living in the Dominican Republic where I am engaged in very
modest efforts to help victims and survivors of the sex trade. This essay is the
fruit of my reflections on the intersections of the sex trade, evil and Christian
theology.
I am not primarily interested in the "problem of evil" as posed by David
Hume and J. L. Mackie which seeks to show the logical absurdity of believing in
both the existence of evil and an omnipotent and benevolent God.^ In contrast to
Mackie, but in accord with historian of philosophy Susan Neiman, I do not
believe evil is a "problem" only for the theist.^ Rather, as Neiman wrote, "the
problem of evil... is fundamentally a problem about the intelligibility of the
world as a whole."^ While the atheist may be able to score points against the
theist by framing the problem as a specific kind of logical puzzle, evil still comes
1 See Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem ofEvil (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 9ff.
2 See David Hume, "Evil and the God of Religion" in The Problem ofEvil: Selected Readings,
ed. Michael L. Peterson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), especially 44, and J.
L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in the same volume, especially 89-90.
3 See Mackie, 89.
4 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History ofPhilosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 7-8.
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2back to haunt the atheist, ultimately challenging her worldview as well. As I
hope to show, I do not believe that the philosophical atheist has the resources
both to take evil seriously and ground hope that lives defeated by evil can be
made whole again. Like the theologian William J. Abraham who as a young
atheist was attracted to Christianity because it took evil with utmost seriousness
without falling into despair, I believe that Christianity offers us more hope to
sustain efforts to relieve suffering and oppose evil than any of its alternatives.^
In fact, in Christ we are offered salvation precisely because evil is so devastating
and ever-present.
My argument is essentially this: The defining characteristic of evil is its de
meaning quality. In chapter one, I reflect on the experience of women in the sex
trade, showing how evil is inherently insensible, how it constricts freedom, how
it is comprised of systems of de-meaning as well as personal choices, and how it
is personally felt as guilt and shame. I also argue that only an eternal, personal
God can ensure the meaning we long for and guarantee victory over evil.
In chapter two, by reflecting on Job and the work of Christ on the cross, I
explore how evil as de-meaning complicates theodicy. The Christian gospel
proclaims that lives can be redeemed and made meaningful again in defiance of
5 William J. Abraham, "Faraway Fields are Green," in God and the Philosophers: The
Reconciliation ofFaith and Reason, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994),
166.
3even the most horrendous evil. But because the nature of evil is de-meaning, God
is not always free to act toward us as justice demands. Yet even when we face the
injustice of God, we may have faith that God loves us and is at work defeating
the de-meaning power of evil.
In chapter three, I will take on the atheistic argument from evil. I will
show that when evil is understood as de-meaning, it is not inconsistent for a
believer to have hope. However, an atheist must either deny evil or hope in order
to remain logically consistent. Given actual evidence of healing in the face of
horrendous evil, I propose that atheism has a "problem of healing" which cannot
be adequately explained without appealing to a personal and loving God.
In chapter four, I will examine the feminist theology of evil of Rita
Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker. I will argue that their conflation of
evil with patriarchy and their determination to approach theology from the
perspective of a victim of abuse actually diminishes the resources of Christianity
to help real victims of abuse. Their proposal that true healing power comes from
human interrelatedness and not from God is not a sufficient foundation to
ground the healing of the world.
Finally, in chapter five, I will examine a competing narrative of salvation
that seeks to redefine prostitution as sex work and normalize it in society. I will
argue that this approach offers important criticisms for the Christian and
4feminist missions to prostitutes, but ultimately fails to save women, men and
children because prostitution should properly be understood as inherently de
meaning. I will conclude by highlighting a few aspects of the Christian salvation
story that are crucial for the Christian mission to prostitutes. The Christian
gospel is our best hope against evil; other salvation narratives lack the resources
necessary either to take evil seriously or ground hope in defiance of evil.
Much has been written about the sex trade recently, especially human
trafficking, which today is understood as a form ofmodem slavery.
Globalization has made human trafficking relatively easy and lucrative, and the
moral outrage against it seems to me to be a fundamentally healthy response.
Nonetheless, we must recognize certain dangers in reading about another
person's suffering, especially suffering which is so closely related to disreputable
sex. Students of the sex trade are vulnerable to a kind of voyeurism or
fascination with the sex trade that does the victims and survivors of evil no
service. In fact, it can become another objectification and commodification of
people that de-means and dehumanizes them. Let the reader beware.
Let the reader also know that I, too, am tempted to voyeurism. The sex
trade holds a certain fascination even for the likes of me�a Christian man who
is, in the main, terrified by it. If I am honest with myself, there is something
compelling about the combination of depravity, evil and the possibility for
5heroism� it is this interest which I have tried to direct toward honest ends by
bringing my thoughts before God. Some time ago, I realized that I could not
continue to study the sex trade; I had to do something about it. To know but not
act is a sort of betrayal of real people. This thesis is my corresponding reflection
on my journey. As the theologian Helmut Thielicke wrote.
Essentially, theological method is characterized by the fact that it takes
into account that God has spoken, and that now what God has spoken is
to be understood and answered. But it can only be understood when I (1)
recognize that what has been said is directed to me, and (2) become
involved in formulating a reply.^
For some reason I do not quite understand, God has spoken to me about his love
for the victims and survivors of the sex trade. I can hardly open the scriptures
without being reminded of God's great concern for justice and mercy for these
marginalized, broken and oppressed people. Please understand that this thesis is
my "hesitant, stammering" response to God's voice in my life.^ In this sense, it is
God who is my primary dialogue partner, and my thesis is a prayer.*
It is appropriate, then, to begin this work with a prayer, and I find myself
drawn to that medieval monk, Anselm, who prayed long ago at the opening of
his Proslogion:
^ Helmut Thielicke, A Little Exercise for Young Theologians, introd. Martin E. Marty, trans.
Charles L. Taylor (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1962), 34.
7 Surin, 143.
8 Thielicke, 33-34.
6Teach me to seek you, and reveal yourself to me as I seek, because I can
neither seek you if you do not teach me how, nor find you unless you
reveal yourself. Let me seek you in desiring you; let me desire you in
seeking you; let me find you in loving you; let me love you in finding
you."9
Amen.
' Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion in The Major Works, ed. with introd. Brian Davies and
G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 86-87.
Chapter 1: The Sex Trade and the Nature of Evil
When my friend Leslie was five years old, her father handed her a note.
He told her to give it to her mother and that he would be back in a few minutes.
She loved her father with all of her heart�he was less serious than her mother
and more emotionally connected to her. He did not come back. Looking back on
this experience as an adult, she wrote:
I gave the letter to my mom, but my dad didn't return. I spent the
rest of my childhood waiting for him to come back, and I can think of
nothing crueler than to be left with the false promise of, "I will return in a
moment." In one blow my faith in people was destroyed, and I became a
sad, scared girl. I sealed up my broken heart from the pain� and from
love.io
Her mother was devastated� in a way, Leslie lost her that day, too. Her
little sister looked to Leslie for guidance, but Leslie could not carry the burden of
being a mother at that tender age. Her childhood was filled with a lingering
sadness.
One bright spot in her life was school which she attended at a monastery.
Slowly, a measure of peace began to return to her life. She wrote:
As it turned out, I loved the primary school (and later the
secondary school). The nuns were very good to me, and I was obedient. I
had very intense spiritual life, and the nuns contributed much to my
1� Leslie Harley, unpublished manuscript, email to author, 9 August 2010. Used with
permission.
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8spiritual formation. Although they taught me a mistaken way of salvation
by works instead of faith, my pure heart was becoming nearer to God.
One precious day at the school that I will always remember came
when I was 12. As I prayed alone in the Chapel of the Monastery, God
whispered into my ear with much affection, "Come and follow me." I
knew at that moment that my heart was going to have only one love the
rest of its life: Jesus.
However, I was so young and timid that I kept this secret hidden in
my heart like a valuable treasure. I was nervous whenever I heard the
voice of Jesus, and I did not know how to communicate to others the
sweet truth of what was happening. I began to listen to an inner music as I
lived in communion with the new Lord ofmy heart.
I went for much of the year without telling anyone about my secret
joy. However, my life had changed and that secret happiness started to
become obvious for others to see. One day the principal of the school, a
very sweet and wise nun, asked me: "Leslie, do you have something to tell
me?"
Upon hearing her question, I was certain the moment had come for
me to share my secret with another person. So I answered her with a
broken and shy voice, "Jesus has called me."
To my surprise, she answered, "I already knew that. My question
is: 'What are you going to do?'"
I simply answered, "Follow Him."
I cherished my time in the monastery. I loved everything about it:
the silence, the order and the cleaning, my times alone praying to God, my
friends, and the counsel I received from my spiritual advisor, the
Masterful Sister of the Nuns. Those years passed seemingly without
problems."
Then, when she was fourteen, her father returned. He had lived in the
United States and fought in Vietnam; he was no longer the same man. The
longed-for reunion became a curse. He raped her.
Crushed, broken-hearted, filled with fear, anger, guilt, and pain, Leslie
kept the abuse a secret and hoped to escape the world in the monastery. But her
11 Ibid.
9father left again and her parents' impending divorce meant that, when it came
time to graduate, the authorities at the monastery would not let her profess to
become a nun, believing that daughters of divorce were not suitable for the
convent.
Betrayed by her father and the church which felt like rejection by God,
Leslie became an atheist and communist. She went to university to try to find
some meaning in her life. She earned her degree and became a professional.
For a while she had a boyfriend, Fernando, who asked her to perform
erotic fantasies for him. Broken emotionally, she was dependent upon this man,
and so she would comply. One day, he asked her to prostitute herself. He took
her to a bar and dropped her off. She had no idea how to prostitute herself, what
to charge, or how to act. While Fernando watched from another part of the bar,
an American asked her if she would accompany him to his hotel room. She
wrote, "everything happened so fast, now I think it was like a dream."^^
Afterwards, Fernando and she celebrated by spending the $100 she earned on
drugs and alcohol.
Thus began her eleven-year career in prostitution. She described this time,
thus:
Leslie Harley, email interview, 5 August 2010.
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For 11 years I played Russian roulette with unknown men, with alcohol,
drug doses unlimited in lonely places, dangerous scenarios with sexual
deviants, [with] violent men, with very competitive and vengeful
prostitutes, with unscrupulous managers of bars [and] in the midst of
dangerous diseases like AIDS. On two occasions, someone threatened me
with a gun. [Once,] I was about to die strangled, [and I] survived two
overdoses.^^
She despised Christians: they were good; she was bad. She did not want help.
She denied God, and, especially at first, she believed that the life was grand� she
had money; she could buy what she wanted.
But, over time, the pain deepened. In moments of solitude and silence, she
was deeply unhappy. She hoped that a man would come into her life and rescue
her, but none came. Sometimes in the brothel, filled with sadness and watching
her life evaporate, she would say a secret prayer. But more and more she began
to think about her own death, until finally she resolved to take her own life.
In her book. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness ofGod, Marilyn McCord
Adams is concerned with the worst sorts of evils, those she called "horrendous
evils." She defined these as "evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or
suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the
participant's life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on
the whole." Examples of horrendous evil include,
1-^ Ibid.
I'' Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness ofGod (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1999), 26.
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the rape of a woman and axing off her arms, psycho-physical torture
whose ultimate goal is the disintegration of personality, betrayal of one's
deepest loyalties, child abuse of the sort described by Ivan Karamazov,
child pornography, parental incest, slow death by starvation, the
explosion of nuclear bombs over populated areas.^^
What makes this sort of evil horrendous is that it engulfs "any positive value in
the participant's life" and its "destructive power reaches... into the deep structure
of the person's frameworks of meaning-making, seemingly to defeat the
individual's value as a person, to degrade him/her to subhuman status."
I propose that the harm that Leslie experienced at the hands of her father
and in the sex trade properly falls under Adams's definition of a "horrendous
evil." The resolution to take her own life demonstrates that she no longer
considered her own life a great good to her. She certainly was devalued,
degraded and treated as a thing.
She is no exception. Prostitution is enormously harmful for all of those
who prostitute themselves. For children, the International Labour Organization
reported:
Commercial sexual exploitation is one of the most brutal forms of violence
against children. Child victims suffer extreme physical, psychosocial and
emotional abuse which have lifelong and life-threatening consequences.
They risk early pregnancy, maternal mortality and sexually transmitted




so deep that many are unable to re-enter or return to a normal way of life.
Many others die before they reach adulthood.^^
Not surprisingly, what harms children also harms adults. Women (and men) in
prostitution face assault and rape; their mortality and suicide rates are extremely
high when compared to the population at large. Many begin to hate their own
bodies, feeling as if they are mere objects, since, in fact, they are treated as such
by the men that use them.^*
Using Adams's definition of evil and Leslie's (and others') experiences as
a starting point, I want to consider more deeply the character of evil. What,
exactly, is evil? Many, both atheists and Christians, have understood the problem
of evil to be primarily a problem of suffering, especially physical suffering. C. S.
Lewis's The Problem ofPain is an accessible Christian treatment of the problem of
evil from this perspective.^^ But in fact, the problem of evil is not a problem with
suffering per se, but with meaningless suffering. And this is to say, that the
problem of evil is really a problem of meaning� the intelligibility of the universe,
as Susan Neiman wrote.^"
17 International Labour Organization, Child Labour. Targeting the Intolerable (Geneva:
International Labor Office, 1996), 17.
18 Sheila Jeffreys, "Prostitution as a Harmful Cultural Practice/' in Not for Sale: Feminists
Resisting Prostitution and Pornography, ed. Rebecca Whisnant and Christine Start (North
Melbourne: Spinifex, 2004), 389-392.
19 C. S. Lewis, The Problem ofPain (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
20 Neiman, 7-8.
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Consider William Rowe's famous example of the fawn that dies a
lingering and agonizing death after a forest fire. If, according to Rowe, the deer's
suffering is "pointless," then God cannot exist because a benevolent God would
not permit pointless suffering.^i Most Christian philosophers have accepted the
premise that if an omniscient, benevolent God exists, pointless suffering cannot.^
All suffering must be meaningful, so they say.
I propose that evil is, in essence, de-meaning. We might say that evil is the
privation of a special kind of good� the basic good of meaning or significance.
The idea of evil as nothing is not new: Plotinus, Augustine and Aquinas have all
understood evil as a corruption of good.^^ But I want to draw attention to evil's
de-meaning quality. Much pain and suffering is meaningful, and in this way,
does not pose a threat to a person's valuing of their own life. The pain of
childbirth, for example, is overwhelmed by the goodness of bringing a new life
into the world. Moreover, significant amounts of evil can be incorporated into a
21 William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American
Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (October 1979): 335-341 and "Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism,
and the Problem of Evil," International journal for Philosophy ofReligion 59 (2006): 79-92.
22 See Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering:
On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance,'" International journal for the Philosophy ofReligion 16
(1984): 73-94; WilUam Alston, "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive
Condition," in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1996): 97-125; Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem ofEvil
(Oxford: Oxford Urviversity Press, 1998). See also WiUiam Hasker's helpful discussion of this
debate in his The Triumph ofGod over Evil: Theodicy for a World ofSuffering (Downers Grove: IVP
Academic, 2008), 177-187.
23 Plotinus The Enneads 1.8.3; Augustine Confessions VII.xii(18)-xiii(19); Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologica 1.49.1.
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meaningful life; consider how many people who have experienced abuse or pain
go on to help others with similar problems. Nonetheless, some evil does
undermine the meaning in one's life, and horrendous evil, as Adams wrote,
threatens the very ability to make meaning of one's life so that it is no longer
considered a good.
What does it mean, then, to make meaning? What is meaning? In this
essay, I am not primarily concerned with the sort of meaning that implies
understanding, but with the sort of meaning that implies valuing. An event, a
life, a thing, a person means something when it holds significance or value for a
person, community or other meaning-maker. Both the individual human and
human communities are loci of meaning. That is, persons make meaning in the
context of their community; they cannot make meanings alone. This is because
the articulation and representation of meaning is based on language which is
possessed by the community. Pre-language human infants are utterly dependent
upon others so that any pre-language meaning-making must be in relation to
others. Moreover, it seems that to be a genuine meaning-maker, one must
possess memory; for meanings must be held, not simply formulated and
forgotten. Meaning is more than goal-directed behavior, which humans share
with non-human animals. (While beyond the scope of my study, it does seem
that some of the higher non-human animals might be meaning-makers.) Rather,
15
memory integrates meanings of life events into an intelligible whole. We humans
always relate meaning through story-telling.^^
Here let me be clear that the significance of a person is not dependent
upon his or her capacity or capability as a meaning-maker. Consider this
example: What is the meaning of the Mona Lisa? Does the Mona Lisa create its
own meaning? Of course not; rather the meaning of the Mona Lisa is bestowed
upon it by the human community. The same principle applies to humans (and
animals). A human individual's meaning is not dependent upon his or her
capacities�not even those capacities required to make meaning, such as
linguistic ability, sociability, or memory. A person with advanced Alzheimer's
disease is still meaningful, even if his or her capacity to make-meaning has been
lost (or severely constrained). An even better example is, of course, the dead,
most of whom remain significant to the living for some time after their death.
Yet, the dead can no longer be meaning-makers, at least not unless they are
resurrected or possess an immortal soul.
2* This is well understood by psychologists. See Robert A. Emmons, The Psychology of
Ultimate Concerns: Motivation and Spirituality in Personality (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999),
45; Jefferson A. Singer and Peter Salovey, The Remembered Self Emotion and Memory in Personality
(New York: The Free Press, 1993); Alfred Adler, The Science ofLiving (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1930), 108ff. While published too late to incorporate her insights into this thesis,
Eleonore Stump's magna opus. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem ofSuffering
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), explores the problem of evil as problem for story-telling. 1 use
"story-telling" in a broad sense here so that music ought to be included.
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Thus, meaning is bestowed by meaning-makers. Those beings that possess
language and memory and are, in some way, connected to a community are
meaning-makers. Healthy, living humans fit this description and are therefore
able to bestow meaning on events, people, animals, and things.
One thing that should be made clear is that meaning is a kind of relation. It
is not something that exists of its own, but always in-relation-to. The Jewish
theologian Martin Buber captured the importance of relation for living in his
influential if opaque / and Thou. He described two "primary words": I-Thou and
Tit. We experience the world through the Tit. The It is an object, "bounded by
others." In contrast, the I-Thou is relation; when addressing a fellow human as
Thou, that person is not experienced as an object among objects, but is
encountered.^^ Or, as Buber more poetically wrote, "All real living is meeting."^^
Most, I suspect, will readily agree that healthy humans make meaning,
that they do this in context of communities, and that meaning is always
relational. More controversial is the idea that there exists an ultimate ground of
all meaning: a transcendent, personal God. This is just the sort of God that is
found in Christianity and Judaism.




Is God necessary for meaning? I argue that God is indeed necessary. But,
in order to explain why, first we need to understand the threat that death is to
meaning-making. For all that we can tell by appearances, we cease to exist at
death and are therefore unable to make meaning of our lives or anything else.
For it is obvious that in order to make meaning, one must be alive. Now, the
death of the individual is certainly a threat to our own individual narratives, but
it is not the end of meaning because communities outlive individual members.
Thus, families, tribes, nations, churches, businesses, schools, and other groups
will continue to remember and value the dead, at least for a time. And once a
person is forgotten, a person's influence may still continue, however tenuously,
through their offspring, productive labor, and ideas. So it is that most people, if
not all, situate their meaning into the greater narratives told by the communities
to which they were aligned. Thus, we intuitively understand genocide to be a
greater evil than the sum total of the individual murders of which it is comprised
since genocide threatens not only individuals but the significance of all
individuals associated with the community itself.
This may seem sufficient for many, but it is not able to ground meaning.
For, in fact, communities also die and cease to exist. Historically, genocide has
proven effective: There simply are no longer Arawak communities in the
18
Caribbean; they have been completely annihilated. Even gradual, non
destructive change can threaten the meaning of communities, as is suggested by
those who wonder if the United States of the present is what its founders fought
and died to secure. But let me be even more direct: Science teaches us that one
day the solar system will no longer be able to support human life. Moreover,
there will come a day when there will be no place in the universe that can
support any kind of life.^^ Ultimately, humanitywill come to an end. When that
happens, all meaning held by the human community will be lost. Since I argue
that memory is necessary for meaning, then we will no longer mean anything
once we are gone and no one is left to remember. Extending our meaning
through genetically-altered human descendents, artificial intelligence, or friendly
aliens only buys us a little extra time. Eventually they will all be gone too.
The philosopher Bertrand Russell understood this. He asked how we
might "preserve [our] aspirations untarnished;" for it was clear to him that:
Man is the product of cause which had no prevision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and
27 Jan Rogoziriski, A BriefHistory of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib to the Present,
Rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Putnam, 2000), 32. The Carib were nearly exterminated; about 3,000
survive on the island of Dominica and many thousands of "Black Carib" or Garinagu live in
Central America and the United States. The Carib language is extinct.
28 See, for example, Jamal N. Islam, The Ultimate Fate of the Universe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 105-111. Islam actually argues that it will be possible for very
advanced and technically ingenious civilization to exist even after super-massive galactic black
holes have evaporated completely some lO^"" years from now. I find this proposition dubious in
the extreme.
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his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no
fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an
individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the
devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius,
are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that
the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried
beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.^^
Russell's solution was to cherish love and resist the irresistible�not much in
which to ground significance, in my opinion, but his soaring speech may inspire:
Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow,
sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of
destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man,
condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through
the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the
lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of
the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built;
undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the
wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the
irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his
condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world
that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of
unconscious power.^"
Yet in the face of that actual unconscious power or human evil, I suspect that
Russell's poetic phrases will be of little succor. The historian Carlos Eire said of
Russell's philosophy, "Safety in despair; if that is not a leap of faith, nothing else
is."^^ For in the end, we still die and are forgotten.
29 Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays
(Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), 41.
30 Ibid., 47.
31 Carlos Eire, A Very BriefHistory ofEternity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010),
14.
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Why isn't one life enough? Why do we long for transcendent, eternal
meaning? That many of us do in fact long for this has been widely acknowledged
by our philosophers and poets, including both those who believe in such
meaning and those who do not. In describing this longing, the Spanish
philosopher-poet Miguel de Unamuno declared "Not to be all and for ever is as if
not to be�at least, let me be my whole self, and be so for ever and ever."32 Either
this longing is the curse of blind evolution� a desire which we are damned
always to be denied� or we really will possess eternal life. It is an old Christian
truth that we are "made for eternity." Lewis argued that "If I find in myself a
desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable
explanation is that I was made for another world."^^
What we need to escape the ultimate loss of meaning is a transcendent
being that can hold our meaning eternally. Since meaning can only be held if one
possesses sociability, community and memory, then this transcendent meaning-
maker must be personal. More specifically, the transcendent meaning-maker
must be eternally and personally in community� just the sort of Trinitarian God
that Christianity proclaims. What Christianity offers then is an eternal source of
meaning in which we can always find meaning and significance.
32 Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense ofLife, trans. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover,
1954), 39.
33 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Collier, 1960), 120.
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But it gets better, for God not only holds meaning, but he resurrects us too
so that we can all share history forever. Over time, as the Jewish theologian Jon
D. Levenson has persuasively argued, the Jews worked through the tension
between the universal fact of death and the promises of God to restore Israel by
coming to believe in a doctrine of universal resurrection. This idea did not come
to the Jews from the Persians, but developed gradually from Jewish sources that
suggested God's healing power and victory must overcome death if God is to
keep his promises.^ Christianity announced that the first fruits of God's reign
had arrived with the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. If the Christian
good news is true, then, we have hope that not only will the significance of our
lives and works be preserved, but we will share the memory of the story for
eternity.
Not only are we meaning-makers, but the personal, transcendent. Triune
God of Christianity bestows meaning upon us by loving us. God is the source of
ultimate meaning so that the meanings that we make are either foimd in God or
are, in fact, meaningless. Without the grounding of our significance in God, our
significance is merely insignificance, the cold comfort of hell. God's love not only
grounds our meaning and the meaning of our lives, but, as Nicholas Wolterstorff
34 Jon D. Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God
ofLife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
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has argued, also grounds human rights more securely than any other political
philosophy which grounds rights in capacities or a concept of human nature
detached from the love of God.^^
We are now in a place to return to the idea of evil as de-meaning. The
foregoing suggests that there are two overlapping ways that evil is experienced.
It can be experienced as losing one's ability to make meaning (or causing one to
lose this ability), and it can be experienced when one is treated in a way contrary
to their transcendent meaning (or treats someone in this way). The former is
another way to describe what Adams calls "horrendous evils," since someone
who can no longer make sense of her life is someone whose life is no longer a
great good to her. But, generally, the former cannot be experienced without the
latter. That is, horrendous evil does not normally come out of the blue, but is
caused by being treated contrary to one's transcendent meaning, that is, being
treated as if one was not beloved by God.
Both human and non-human agents cause evil. Christianity teaches that
death is not "natural," rather it is an enemy that God will defeat. Thus, cancer,
tsunamis, and other natural destructive forces are disordered, and humans
35 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008).
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experience them as violations of their dignity, even though these events do not
have volition of their own. Does God then cause them?
Herein we have a tension within Christianity (and Judaism). For God is
clearly the Lord of nature: Jesus is able to still the waters with a word.^^ Yet,
creation is also "subjected to futility;" it is not what it should be.^^ By faith we
believe that "this world [is] only a shadow of the fuller, richer, more substantial,
more glorious creation that God intends" and that it "is a shattered mirror of
divine beauty, still full of light, but riven by darkness."^^ Nature is good, yet
broken; God is Lord, yet not all is under his reign. We must, as theologian David
Bentley Hart wrote, take this on faith. The resurrection of Jesus Christ shows us
that God is working to redeem creation and humankind from evil and from
death.^^ When we look on the face of death, when we battle cancer, when our
communities are devastated in natural disasters, we see the enemy, not God.^�
These things are still evil�essentially meaningless� and they work to de-mean
us.
36 Matthew 8:26; Mark 4:39.
37 Romans 8:20 NRSV.





Easier to understand is how we de-mean each other. We do this when we
treat people as if they were things and not people beloved by God. Another way
to say this is when we violate a person's basic human rights, especially the rights
to respect, to control over his or her body, and to life. It is also possible to de
mean ourselves. For example, we de-mean ourselves when we treat our body as
a thing to be used or consumed rather than as ourselves. Also, we de-mean
ourselves when we de-mean others since it is contrary to our transcendent
meaning to destroy or harm each other.
Sin is our own participation in evil when we act to de-mean ourselves or
others. However, in situations of horrendous evil, we may have few good
options to avoid this participation. One of my undergraduate professors, an
expert on the Sudan, told the story of a woman and her three children who made
it to a refugee camp in the Sudan. After some time, the children, recovering from
starvation, began to play like children do. The mother, however, became
inconsolable. The relief workers tried to tell her that her children would be fine,
that they would live. She finally told them, "you see, I have six children, but I
could only carry three." A mother should not have to choose which of her
children will live and which will die� it undermines the meaning of
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motherhood; it is a great evil.*^ By so choosing, she must participate in evil, even
if her participation mitigates it.
A similar situation exists in the sex trade. While many women and
children are forced or tricked into the trade, some women "choose" it as the best
option for making a living given what seems available. Consider a Dominican
woman who was married as a young teen and bore her husband several
children. But after several years, the husband abandoned her. Without an
education or any skills, she went to look for work in the capital, but could not
find any, which is not surprising since the people of the Dominican Republic face
chronic underemployment even for skilled workers. She turned to prostitution.
This was entirely "voluntary," in the sense that no one else was making her
prostitute herself and she is "free" to leave the trade at any time, but her other
options are not very good, and, in fact, finding a way out soon becomes
something very difficult to imagine. Thus, many women (and men and children)
participate in their own de-meaning.
Some sin, however, is not a result of constricted circumstances, but the
fruit of our own corrupt will. One key insight of Judaism and Christianity is that
we are -part of the problem. Evil is not simply something external to us; it is inside
�41 A fictional account of a similar choice is found in William Styron's Sophie's Choice: A
Novel (New York: Random House, 1979).
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us as well. Sometimes I do what I want to do, knowing that it is harmful. In
reflecting on an incident where he and some friends stole some pears, the
theologian Augustine concluded "I had no motive for my wickedness except
wickedness itself."42 Even St. Paul found that "when I want to do what is good,
evil lies close at hand."� Recognizing our own complicity and compromise with
evil by repenting of it is necessary for us to experience the good news of the reign
of God.44
Does this analysis reduce evil to blaming the victim? For evils such as the
sex trade, it is far simpler to blame the victim than to work for transformation.
But acknowledging one's personal complicity with sin is not the same as blaming
the victim. First, evil is greater than any one person's sin. As we have seen, the
whole world has gone wrong. In addition, as evil grows in strength it becomes
much more difficult to do good. This is especially true when experiencing
horrendous evils, which I have argued include the sex trade. Thus, even if a
person is complicit with evil, he or she is also trapped in it. The evil that befalls
us is never entirely our fault, as the book of Job so admirably demonstrates. But
we must also avoid dismissing personal sin as irrelevant. People complicit in
42 Augustine Confessions II.iv(9).
� Romans 7:21 NRSV.
44 Mark 1:15.
evil� such as the Sudanese mother� carry the burden of guilt and full healing
requires forgiveness, not simply being told that they are not to blame.
People who experience evil often feel guilt or shame. Guilt is, in part, the
feeling of revulsion against our own participation in evil� that is, against our
own sin. Feeling guilty is feeling unclean. We want to be clean again, but we may
not believe that becoming clean is possible. Shame, however, is more than guilt;
rather, it is felt de-meaning. In this sense, it includes guilt, because in guilt we
recognize our own actions have de-meaned us as well as others. We simply are
not meant to sin. But shame may be felt when guilt is not present. Shame is
typically associated with being de-meaned by others, social disapproval or loss
of control over one's life, especially one's body. When someone de-means us
whether publicly or privately, we feel shame. Being publicly dressed down or
secretly abused will both produce shame, even when we are innocent of
wrongdoing. Even life-enhancing choices may incur shame when the society in
which we are a part punishes us for good choices�one thinks of the character of
Volodin in Solzhenitsyn's novel. In the First Circle. Volodin betrayed the Soviet
government for whom he had long served in order to keep his conscience alive,
but he is caught and sent to the gulag.^^ Losing control over one's body is also a
45 Daniel J. Mahoney, "The Moral Witness of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn," First Things, no.
196 (October 2009): 46-47; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, In the First Circle: A Novel: The Restored Text,
trans. Harry T. Willetts (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009).
28
common source of shame� consider how something as innocuous as untimely
flatulence can cause deep embarrassment. More pointed is the loss of health due
to cancer or paralysis which requires one to become completely dependent upon
others for even the most basic and intimate tasks. Because our bodies are integral
to who we are, and not merely a tool of the mind, our loss of control over our
bodies de-means us by making us less than who we are meant to be. Of course,
sometimes being de-meaned by others, social disapproval and loss of control are
all combined�victims of torture being the clearest example of this sort of evil.
Prostitutes experience much guilt and shame. Their work meets with
widespread social disapproval. Philip Yancey opens his book. What's So Amazing
about Grace?, with the story of a prostitute who would never dream of going to a
church for help because she is certain they would make her feel worse about
herself.*^ Most prostitutes in the Dominican Republic seem reluctant to go to
church in the towns where they prostitute themselves (though I have known
some to go when invited). But prostitutes are not simply de-meaned by society,
prostitution is de-meaning at its very core. I realized this very clearly when
visiting a friend in Mexico who runs refuge houses for girls coming out of
prostitution. He wanted to show me what some of the secure brothels are like.
We went in and three women came out and posed for us to see if we wanted to
46 Philip Yancey, What's So Amazing about Grace? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997), 11.
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buy them. It was at the moment that I experienced how de-meaning prostitution
was, for I was expected to look upon those women as objects, as if I could buy
them. The basic premise of prostitution requires the customer to treat the
prostitute as if she (or he) was less than human.
Moreover, women in the sex trade do not have complete control over their
own bodies. Many of the women who enter prostitution have already been
sexually abused as children; in fact these children are targets for pimps.^' The
alienation from one's own body that this causes certainly makes it easier to
contemplate becoming a prostitute. My friend Leslie, who was raped by her
father, wrote this about her experience:
El primer dafio que he podido encontrar es que he visto a mi cuerpo como
mi peor enemigo, mi cuerpo ha sido una verdadera carcel de horror para
mi. The first way that it damaged me was that I saw my body as my worst
enemy; my body truly became a prison ofhorror for me}^
The alienation from one's own body permits one to see one's body as something
other than oneself, but as a tool to be used and abused. Prostitutes are at
significant risk for rape, and, in fact, many men believe they can do what they
47 Joe Parker, "How Prostitution Works," in Not for Sale: Feminists Resisting Prostitution
and Pornography, eds. Christine Stark and Rebecca Whisnant (North Melbourne: Spirufex Press,
2004), 11. See also Janice G. Raymond et al., A Comparative Study ofWomen Trafficked in the
Migration Process: Patterns, Profiles and Health Consequences ofSexual Exploitation in Five Countries
(Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela and the United States) (Coalition Against Trafficking
in Women, 2002), 54ff.
4� Harley, Jesus Sabe, impublished manuscript, email to author, 8 June 2009. All
translations from this source are by the author.
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want with a prostitute because they have paid for it. The Catholic sisters of Las
Adoratrices Esclavas del Santfsimo Sacramento y de la Caridad in Santiago,
Dominican Republic, go to the local hospital every week asking about those
prostitutes who have been admitted after having suffered physical abuse at the
hands of their customers. They do this because it is so common to find abused
prostitutes there. As law professor Catharine MacKinnon said in a debate, "In
prostitution, women have sex with men they would never otherwise have sex
with. The money thus acts as a form of force, not as a measure of consent."*^
Women in prostitution do not have complete control over their bodies.
Together, the revulsion of prostitution by the public, its inherently de
meaning nature and the loss of control over one's own body, mean that women
in prostitution are often burdened with shame. They feel that their lives are de
meaned, and this feeling is reinforced throughout the various dimensions of their
lives. If evil is de-meaning, then the sex trade is very evil.
Evil is experienced as an active force. While many Christian theologians
and philosophers have argued that evil is essentially nothing, they have
nonetheless understood it is not felt as nothing; in fact, it is a powerful
destructive force, and most of the time, de-meaning is felt as if it is a personal
49 Intelligence Squared, U.S., "It's Wrong to Pay for Sex," transcript of televised debate,
(April 21, 2009), 28.
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assault on one's dignity, even if it comes through natural forces such as cancer or
tsunamis. Consider how Augustine, in reflecting on his theft of pears he did not
desire, concluded that he had "loved nothing but the theft itself," but
furthermore, "theft itself was a nothing."5o Yet he nonetheless enacted evil.
In one of the most important modern works of theodicy (broadly defined),
Augustine's modern, secular Jewish student Hannah Arendt reflected on the
meaning of the trial of Adolf Eichmann for his crimes against the Jewish people
and humanity during the Holocaust.^^ Here, she came to understand evil as
something superficial:
Evil possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow
and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus
on the surface.^2
Arendt is trying to make evil both comprehensible and lend hope for its defeat.^^
By arguing that it is merely "banal," and not demonic, she understands the evil
of Eichmann and the Holocaust as mere "thoughtlessness." Eichmann was no
"villain," rather.
50 Augustine Confessions II.viii(16).
51 For the connection between Arendt and Augustine, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine
and the Limits ofPolitics (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 69ff; Eric Gregory, Politics
and the Order ofLove: An Augustinian Ethic ofDemocratic Citizenship (Chicago: U of Chicago Press,
2008), 198-201.
52 Flannah Arendt, "Eichmann in Jerusalem: An Exchange of Letters between Gershom
Scholem and Hannah Arendt," Encounter 22 (January 1964): 51-56, quoted in Neiman, 301.
53 See Neiman, 301-304.
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Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal
advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in
no way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in
order to inherit his post. He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never
realized what he was doing.^^
The Court could not abide the suspicion that Eichmann was, in fact, a "clown,"
for such a "suspicion would have been fatal to the whole enterprise, and was also
rather hard to sustain in view of the sufferings he had caused to millions of
people."^^ In considering Eichmann's complicity in evil, Arendt had revealed
how evil could be meaningless for the perpetrator, yet felt as a deeply personal
assault on the dignity of the victim. Evil thus has this dual characteristic: an
inexplicability� a thoughtlessness and meaninglessness, but also a deeply active
and powerful assault on meaning.
While Arendt eschews the demonic as too appealing and perhaps too
great to confront, no doubt many will continue to understand evil personalized
in demonic forces. Arendt is trying to understand how evil came to be, but the
victim is trying to understand what it means for them. The personalization of
evil in demonic forces is a story which helps recover meaning from the abyss. It
is, in fact, a way of trying to endure. In this sense, Arendt who understands evil
54 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality ofEvil, rev. ed. (New
York: Viking, 1964), 287.
55 Ibid., 54.
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as an undirected fungus and the victim who feels it as a demonic presence share
the same goal, that of fostering hope that opposing evil will not be in vain.
The connection between belief in demonic forces and the fact that the
victim feels personally assaulted by evil, is not well understood by modern
scholars. For example, the historian Joseph F. Kelly, connects belief in Satan with
the "demonization" of other people. But it seems to me that the relationship also
works the other way.^^ People easily understand the existential threat other
people may pose to them (and, thus, religion is not needed to demonize others.)
So when people experience the indignities of evil uncaused by human agents,
they quite naturally interpret those events as personal assaults by demonic
forces. Thus, a life-story that includes personal demonic forces makes more sense
to many than one that excludes it. We can expect belief in demons to remain.
That evil is personal and active is how the book of Job portrays it. The
Accuser (Satan) of Job (and of God, indirectly) actually de-means Job with his
accusation. The accusation is, in a sense, a nothing� a lie, but also an assault on
Job's dignity. For Job, the resulting evil that overcomes him (he is unaware of the
prompting accusation) certainly feels personal.
56 Joseph F. Kelly, The Problem ofEvil in the Western Tradition: From the Book ofJob to Modern
Genetics (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 110-118, 214-215.
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If evil is active de-meaning that prompts guilt and shame, it also ensnares
us. Evil is also often felt as a constriction of liberty�which it certainly is. We
have seen how horrendous evil can lead to situations where no choice is good
and we are compelled to be complicit in our own or others' destruction. But
frequently evil traps us much more gradually. Think of how addictions can make
us feel good, but in the end they can take over our lives. Certainly the sex trade is
a trap for many. Many girls become prostitutes after being raped� an experience
which can encourage a girl to think that all she is good for is to be used by men.
Moreover, the ever-present threat of violence by handlers or pimps makes it very
difficult to escape. While no one is completely autonomous, some real freedom
is necessary to make meaning of one's life. When one is forced into complying
with other people's desires, one's ability to lead a life meaningful to oneself is
severely constricted. When one is compelled to commit acts of evil, one's life can
contradict one's envisioned and true meaning for it; one's own life may no longer
be considered a great good. Thus, escape from evil by necessity involves true
freedom to own one's life by making choices that enhance life's meaning.
57 See, for example, Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal
Underworld (New York: Knopf, 2008), 17-18, 105-107; Dawn Herzog Jewell, Escaping the Devil's
Bedroom: Sex Trafficking, Global Prostitution and the Gospel's Transforming Power (Oxford: Monarch,
2008), 41-45, 58-60; Craig McGill, Human Traffic: Sex, Slaves and Immigration (London: Vision,
2003), 76ff; Rita Nakashima Brock and Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: Prostitution
and Liberation in Asia and the United States (Mirmeapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 160-177.
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The final characteristic of evil I wish to consider is its deceptive quality. If
good and evil were really black and white, we would be able to offer greater
resistance to the evil in our world. But evil is characterized by deception so that
we believe that we are engaging in meaningful, life-affirming acts when, in fact,
we are de-meaning ourselves or others. One of the best examples of this comes
again from Arendt's attempt to understand Eichmann. Eichmann's memories
and ideas were terribly inconsistent, changing with his moods, yet Eichmann
himself seemed oblivious to his own inconsistency. He was not a clever liar;
rather, his mind was "filled to the brim" with "self-fabricated stock phrases" that
were "as devoid of reality as those cliches by which the [German] people had
lived for twelve years."^^ What enabled a man as empty of character and mind as
Eichmann to become one of the greatest criminals of the 20'^ century? It was
that German society of eighty million people had been shielded against
reality and factuality by exactly the same means, the same self-deception,
lies and stupidity that had now become ingrained in Eichmann's
mentality. These lies changed from year to year, and they frequently
contradicted each other; moreover, they were not necessarily the same for
the various branches of the Party hierarchy or the people at large. But the
practice of self-deception had become so common, almost a moral
prerequisite for survival. . ..^^
Mass self-deception was necessary for the evil on the scale produced by Nazi




slave South. People's lives are meaningful when in relation with their fellows, but
when an entire people live a lie that enables them to treat a certain group of
people as things, then that people loses meaning, even if they imagine otherwise.
In order for Nazi or Soviet self-deception to work, each nation isolated
itself from the greater world community. The same thing happens with
individuals. One thing that self-deception does is cut people off from
relationships so that they are no longer able to see their own lives from a
different perspective. In his book. People of the Lie, The psychologist M. Scott Peck
proposed we consider evil a psychological disorder. One of the key ingredients
to being an evil person, as his title suggests, is that the person lives a lie.^� One
reason that we lie to ourselves and others is because the truth is unpleasant and
difficult. The truth means we must change, and perhaps we do not know how to
do that, or we are afraid of what the changes might bring. For some of us, change
would certainly mean attending to great pain and suffering in our lives. Lying to
ourselves and others is a way to avoid this pain and try to retain our freedom
and meaning in our lives. But not all of the meanings we make for ourselves are
true ones, and when we begin to live a lie, our deception takes us further away
from healing.
60 M. Scott Peck, People of the Lie: The Hope for Healing Human Evil (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1983).
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Christians must not let go of the idea of truth even though it is not very
popular these days. Postmodernism has rightly chastened the modernist effort to
interpret the world through an objective narrative. Yet no history can be written
without interpretation; no story can be told without meaning, for stories are
essentially meaningful. Postmodernism has bequeathed us an "incredulity
toward meta-narratives," though we should rightly understand this incredulity
first as a reaction against scientistic modernism with its appeals to a universal
reason, not Christianity. Rationalistic modernism simply cannot offer people
the meaning they crave, and it is the emptiness that postmoderns rightly resist.
Christian claims to truth are not of the same type as rationalistic claims. Its
veracity does not depend upon an appeal made to a universal reason that we all
share, but to a person, Jesus Christ. That is, for Christians, truth is grounded, not
in abstract reason, but in relation. It is not possible for us to see the world "from
everywhere" (that is, as God sees it), but it is possible to see the world from here
and there. It is this will to truth expressed by loving others�by embracing them�
that characterizes Christianity.^^ Jesus said "I am the way, and the truth, and the
" James K. A. Smith, Who's Afraid ofPostmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to
Church (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 62-65. Smith is quoting Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (MinneapoUs:
U of Minnesota Press, 1984).
62 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 250ff.
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life. No one comes to the Father except through me."^^ Note the close connection
between truth and following Christ, the "way." Truth is not only something that
is known; it is something that is obeyed.
At the popular level, the loss of confidence in Christianity is not due so
much to philosophical postmodernism or even religious pluralism, but simply to
not living out the gospel. Following Jesus is hard�Jesus said so himself�but
many would-be Christians do not really try. We live in a world choked with
weeds that crowd out the good news of the gospel. Consider the widespread
biblical illiteracy in the Western church today. For Christianity is a meta-
narrative� a grand story�that ought to shape the meaning of our lives, and can,
in fact, empower us to stand against and be healed from the most grievous evils.
But it will not help us if we do not really believe it or obey it, and we cannot
believe or obey it if we do not even know the story.
Some stories are truer than others. Without God's love and power to hold
the meaning of our lives and resurrect us to new life with God and those who
love Christ, our lives lose their meaning. This fact is evident when we consider
those who are dying. What gives their life meaning? Most often it was what they
did and were for others that is the source of their joy or regret� and ours. If we
are to experience meaning in its fullness then we must step outside ourselves and
� John 14:6 NRSV.
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embrace the other, seeking truth in love. As a Christian, I believe that this is only
possible with the grace and love of God. Otherwise evil threatens to overwhelm
us all.
Chapter 2: Evil and Theodicy
In the first chapter, I sketched the character of evil using the sex trade as
my primary example. In this chapter I want to reflect briefly on the challenge that
de-meaning evil poses for people of faith. The Christian salvation narrative in
Scripture teaches us that God is at work in the world to defeat evil. When evil
seems victorious, faith in God is rightly tested. One response is theodicy� the
effort to defend God's existence and goodness in the face of evil. I want to
humbly suggest that a successful defense of God is sometimes impossible
because, by its very nature, de-meaning evil constrains God, so that God must
sometimes act unjustly toward us. The death and resurrection of Jesus Christ
give us hope, however, that God's promises will yet be fulfilled in us even in face
of overwhelming horrendous evil. In the end, however, it is God who must
defend God or we will not be able to sustain our faith.
The book of Job paints a portrait of evil's de-meaning quality. The lie with
which Satan accuses Job de-means him. In the heavenly court, God praises Job,
declaring him a "blameless and upright man who fears God and turns away
from evil" and noting that "there is no one like him on the earth."^ But Satan
"4 Job 1:8 NRSV.
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casts doubt on God's claim, inciting God to destroy Job "for no reason/'^^ Soon,
Job himself sits on the brink of the abyss, feeling his life de-meaned. He believes
it would have been better to have never been born than to be abandoned by God
as he has been.^^ Moreover, Job uses images like that of the "Pit" to indicate how
thoroughly his life has become a living death.^^We sense in these exchanges both
the "nothingness" of evil and its personal force.
It is important to note that the reason God destroys Job is made clear right
from the start: to demonstrate and glorify Job's goodness. The author of the book
considered this a good purpose for it cuts to the heart of the meaning of Job's life.
Job ought to be praised precisely because his life is well-lived and means
something to God and others. In fact, it seems that God draws Satan's attention
to Job as an apologia for goodness� a demonstration of its possibility. Satan will
have none of it; all good is doubted. If Job can be vindicated, however, Satan's
justification for his own rebellion will have been undermined� in fact, it will
have been shown to be the sham that it is. Moreover, the vindication of Job will
bring Job glory in the heavenly court as well as validate God's own word. These
are high stakes. Moreover, the nature of the situation precludes Job from
knowing the reason evil befalls him. It is not just that Job does not know the
� Job 2:3 NRSV.
66 Job 3.
67 Cf. Job 9:31, 17:14; Levenson, 68-71.
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reason for his suffering; he cannot know it or the entire test will fail to achieve the
good of Job's and God's vindication.
Another interesting aspect of the portrayal of evil in the book of Job is that
evil is something God directs. God claims that he destroyed Job, even though it
was at the instigation of Satan.^^ At no point in Job's accusations does God plead
innocent as the source of Job's destruction; rather, God assumes all of the
responsibility. This responsibility for evil is not, however, assumed in such a way
as to challenge the fundamental goodness of God for the author of the book. It is
not that God is "growing" in maturity, for example. Rather, God defeats evil by
incorporating it into a larger narrative of ultimate goodness for those whose faith
is in him. Because evil is ultimately nothing, it cannot mar the goodness of God
and need not lead to Job's dishonor.
One of the insights I wish to suggest from understanding evil as de
meaning is that evil in and of itself is and must be inexplicable. One cannot
"make sense" of evil; it is by its very nature meaningless. But meaning can
always be made of peoples' lives. That is, meaning is always rooted in
something� that is, in good. So, on one hand, we must say that evil is insensible;
while on the other hand, healing (or re-meaning) is always possible for a person,
even in the face of the most horrendous evils.
68 Job 2:3.
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Because healing is possible does not mean it is necessary. Lurking in the
background of the Job story is the Satan figure who refuses to submit to
goodness by responding cynically rather than faithfully. It is certainly possible�
and indeed the rest of Scripture suggests it is quite likely� that, tragically, some
evil will remain unredeemed, though the book of Job and the Scripture as a
whole teach that those who respond to God in faith have nothing to fear.
Yet another feature of Job for our discussion is the contrast between Job's
response and that of his three friends. Job accuses God of unjustly becoming his
enemy, leaving him alone and overpowered; his three friends defend the mercy
and justice of God. In effect, the friends offer Job a theodicy� a defense of the
justice of God. This theodicy is quite orthodox: God is trustworthy; he does great
things; he raises the lowly and saves the needy. Accepting God's discipline heals
us, and God will save Job, too, if Job submits. Eliphaz and his friends have
themselves experienced God's grace and know its truth.^^ In all of the long
centuries since the book of Job was written, one can hardly find a better theodicy
than that offered by Eliphaz. Yet God's wrath was against Eliphaz and his




Let those who seek to justify God beware. In the heavenly court God
declared his injustice toward Job by saying that he had destroyed Job without
reason. God was not justified in his actions against Job, and so Job's accusations
against God are right speech. Job was in the right and God in the wrong. What
sense are we to make of this?
I want to hold this question in mind while turning briefly to consider the
limits of theodicy in light of the Holocaust�or any other horrendous evil. Rabbi
and theologian Irving Greenberg, reflecting on how the Germans would
sometimes throw children alive into the furnaces, set forth the following criterion
for speech: "No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would
not be credible in the presence of burning children."^^
Now this is an impossible criterion against which to measure the
intelligibility of speech or even theological speech. Our praise of God and
gratitude toward God should not be hostage to evil. To do so would give evil a
sort of perverse victory by de-meaning all speech. On the other hand, and this is
important, the reality of burning or raped children demonstrates the seriousness
the problem of evil has for the believer. Years later, Greenberg revisited his
criterion, and I believe his deeper reflection illuminates the challenges evil
71 Irving Greenberg, "Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire: Judaism, Christianity, and
Modernity after the Holocaust," Auschwitz: Beginning ofa New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust, ed.
Eva Fleischner (New York: KTAV Publishing, 1977), 23.
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presents for the faithful. I ask the reader's indulgence to let me quote him at
length. He wrote:
It's hard to speak of a loving God, it's hard to speak of even being in the
image of God, infinitely valuable and unique, in a world which babies
were burned alive by the Nazis and no one lifted a finger, in which people
were gassed en masse. For example, there was a department of the SS that
was in charge of bringing down the price of that gassing to make human
life even cheaper. How do you speak, then, of a God who treasures
humans or, in Christian terms, of a God who loved the world so much he
would sacrifice his own son, and yet, here it is that, to save a half a
penny's worth of gas, people were burned alive? The answer is, it's very
difficult. And for many Jews, it has been a crisis of faith.
In the presence of burning children, how could one talk of a loving
God? I once wrote that no theological statement should be made that
would not be credible in the presence of burning children. What could
you say about God when a child is burning alive? My answer is there's
nothing to say. If there's anything you can do, jump into that pit and pull
the child out. And if you can heal that child, if you can pour oil on their
burns, then you are making a statement about God.
Speaking personally, my first emotional encounter with the
Holocaust overwhelmed me. As an Orthodox rabbi, it was totally
unexpected and devastating. There were days when I would say the
words that we pray daily as Orthodox Jews, and I felt, how can I say
them? It would be almost like a mockery of the children to speak of the
God who� as we do in our central prayer� redeems the children and
saves them for the sake of his great name. How could you say that in a
generation where there was no liberation?
It's one of those devastating things you live with for the rest of
your life. For those who have lost their faith because of it, I can only say I
came to respect that. Even for the most devout people, there are moments
when the ashes and the smoke of Auschwitz choke off any contact with
God or heaven. Therefore, I came to see that the line between the believer
and the doubter is much thinner than I once thought.
The answer is you live torn. At one point, the way I put it was that
my faith is shattered, but then I was reminded of a famous line of Rabbi
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Nachman's, the great Hasidic rebbe of Breslov, who once said, "No heart
is so whole as a broken heart." So, I came to believe that maybe "no faith
is so whole as a broken faith," and I could, in a sense, admire people who
responded to the Holocaust by losing their faith, because their passion,
their love of God and of people made it impossible to say empty words
about God. I felt more sympathy for them than I did for people who went
on praying as if nothing had ever changed, as if one could talk
complacently and confidently about a God who exists self-evidently, as if
that's true. It just couldn't be.^^
What I want to convey here through Rabbi Greenberg is the gravity of evil and
its challenge to the meaning of our lives and the story of the world. The book of
Job is written for this sort of horrendous evil; it must have something to say for
victims of horrendous de-meaning evils like the Holocaust or the sex trade.
What the book of Job does not do is explain evil. I have argued that evil
itself is fundamentally meaningless and remains on that level inexplicable. But
one thing the book of Job does suggest is that, for God, there is distinction
between evil as de-meaning and evil as injustice. In order to prevent Job's de
meaning at the hands of his accuser, God acts unjustly toward Job. Job's friends
are determined to defend God's justice by proffering a theodicy, but God seems
to desire that they defend Job against God by speaking truly about God's
injustice. For it is only through the injustice of God that the evil of de-meaning is
overcome and defeated.
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If I am correct in my interpretation of Job, then a theodicy of God's justice
in the face of horrendous evil is, quite frankly, the wrong approach. Instead we
ought to label the Holocaust for what it is: God's injustice toward the Jews.
Similarly, the sex trade is God's injustice toward women and children.
I must pause here and interrupt the flow of my argument with a prayer
because the words I have written above are too heavy for me, and, frankly, I am
frightened by them. Holy One, let me plead for your pardon if, by error, I have
blasphemed your justice and mercy. Your word is my delight and my hope. It
seems both in Scripture and in history you have acted unjustly toward those that
love you; how could I not wonder "How long?"^^ Yet I cling to your promises to
bless, heal and restore your people� that however unjust your actions may be or
seem to be, you will not abandon us to the abyss and that nothing can separate
us from your love.^*
The book of Job does have something very important to teach us about
our response to God when faced with his injustice. The response that God longs
for is the response of faith. What Job needed was not an explanation of the evil
that befell him; he needed to know that the God of faith had not abandoned him.
Some scholars have suggested that Job did not receive the answer he was looking
73 Cf. Revelation 6:10.
74 Cf. Psalm 40:16-17, Isaiah 61, Ezekiel 37:12-14, Luke 1:72-75, Revelation 21:3-5.
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for and was rather cowed by God's declarations of his power. This seems to me
to be a false reading for it does not explain Job's submission. Eleonore Stump has
argued that
it is a mistake... to characterize God's speeches as demonstrating nothing
but God's power over creation. The speeches certainly do show God's
power; but, equally importantly, they show God having personal
interactions with all of his creatures. He relates to everything he has made
on a face-to-face basis, as it were; and in these personal interactions, God
deals maternally with his creatures, from the sea and rain to the raven and
the donkey and even the monstrous behemoth and leviathan. He brings
them out of the womb, swaddles, feeds, and guides them, and even plays
with them. Most importantly, he talks to them; and somehow, in some
sense or other, they talk to him in return. These speeches thus show God
as more than powerful; they show him as personally and intimately
involved with his creation; they portray him as having a mother's care
towards all his creatures, even the inanimate ones.''^
Seeing God face-to-face and hearing assurances of his deep care for one
personally does seem sufficient to explain Job's humility. One senses that Job
longed to submit, but God's rejection of him had made that impossible. When
God revealed himself to Job, then Job knew that he, too, was still under God's
personal care and not cast off. His heart's desire� and the meaning of his life�
were still secure.
The "answer" to the problem of evil is, then, not in understanding, but in
faith. Stump went on to argue, rightly I believe, that this answer is not a faith in
facts about God or the sort of belief that concurs "that God exists, that he is
75 Eleonore Stump, "Faith and the Problem of Evil," in Seeking Understanding: The Stob
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powerful, that he can arrange our lives as he likes, that he does not arrange them
as we like, and that we have to accept it at his hand, with whatever patience we
can muster, because he is God." Rather faith is "believing that God is really good
and so keeps his promises."^^ Make no mistake: this sort of faith is not easy, nor
does it lessen the pain. We can sympathize as Rabbi Greenberg does with those
who lose faith in face of horrendous evil.^^ May we not be similarly tested!
We might still ask how can injustice promote healing? Does not injustice
also de-mean? Certainly it is often so. This is because injustice contradicts a
person's rights. Here we are especially concerned with those rights that exist
because God loves us. Thus, we all have an inherent right to respect due us
because we are God's special creation, deeply loved by God. For us, rights are
useful shorthand for understanding right relation with each other and with God.
I cannot be in right relationship with God unless I choose to love God freely.
Thus, religious liberty� the right to practice one's religion without interference�
is a prerequisite for right relationship with God, even if many people do not
enjoy such a relationship. What the right to religious liberty does is help us think
about our obligations and claims toward each other. Because God must be loved
and worshipped freely, I must not coerce another to believe or worship in a way
76 Ibid., 549.
77 In fact, we might be cautious about declaring this sort of imbeUef to be a loss of faith,
for it seems that if God were to show up as he did for Job, faith could be quickly restored.
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contrary to their will. Rights are useful in helping us adjudicate certain
conflicting claims against each other.
In our relationship with God, however, our rights do not serve quite the
same function. Nonetheless, because God loves us and has made promises
toward us, we do have certain rights and may make certain claims against God.
In fact, God's promises are sufficiently great that we might claim that God has an
obligation to resurrect us so that his promises might be fulfilled in our lives.
Indeed it is difficult to imagine how God's promises could be fulfilled without
such a resurrection. But in saying this, we have now acknowledged that, in this
life, God's promises toward us are not fully fulfilled. What claims can we assert
against God here and now?
Job certainly asserted the claim that God must not destroy him as if he
was an enemy of God. This claim was implicitly asserted on the obligations
created by God's friendship and mercy. Because God praised Job for right
speech, it seems that God legitimized this claim. Yet, God could not (for a time)
actualize this claim without Job and God being de-meaned. It seems, then, that
the very nature of evil constrains God's ability to act justly until such time as evil
is defeated. Yet, even the defeat of evil must be done with mercy for those
51
trapped in it, and thus (if I may turn around Theodore Parker's phrase), though
the arc of the moral universe bends toward justice, it is very long/^
Rights and justice are both concerned with right relationship between and
among humans, but also between people and God. As I have argued, the
meaning of our lives cannot be disentangled from relationship. Right
relationship is always grounded in love. And it is here where we must seek an
answer to how injustice can defeat de-meaning.
The New Testament teaches us that Jesus Christ's sacrifice on the cross
was an act of faith and love. It was also unjust. Jesus asked the Father for the cup
to be removed�this suggests that, for Jesus, his death was, in some way, in the
hands of the Father, not the Romans. I do not think we go wrong in saying that
the Father was unjust to the Son in this. The Christ is a Job-figure, or better yet,
the experience of Job prefigures that of the Christ. Like Job, Jesus is vindicated
and glorified after passing through the test. And through his passion, he atoned
for the sins of the world and made a new world possible.
In considering the cross, we might say the possibility of right relationship
with God is dependent upon injustice. But, if we examine it closely, we see that it
is a special kind of injustice� the kind of injustice that heals, rather than
78 Theodore Parker, "Of Justice and the Conscience," in Ten Sermons ofReligion, 2"'' ed.
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79 Luke 22:42
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destroys. First, we must remember that, according to the scriptures, Jesus Christ
is not an innocent third party, but God in the flesh. So while we may say that the
Father was unjust to the Son, we cannot say the God was unjust to Jesus since
Jesus is also God. As Miroslav Volf has argued, Jesus Christ "stands firmly on the
side of the forgiving God, not between the forgiving God and forgiven
humanity," and in this way, "The One who was offended bears the burden of the
offense."^" The injustice of the cross makes possible forgiveness, reconciliation
and justice.
Second, the resurrection of Jesus transforms the de-meaning power of evil
and death. In so doing, it makes a deeper justice possible. It is only with the
resurrection that we can make sense of our lives in face of horrendous evil. By
absorbing the de-meaning blow of the cross on our behalf, Jesus Christ makes
possible the re-meaning healing power of the resurrection for all. In a real way,
then, we participate in the sufferings of Christ and he participates in ours
whenever we endure (or are destroyed by) horrendous evil. Yet, even here, our
very destruction may reveal our own meaning, defeating the de-meaning power
of evil through the grace and love of God. Those who doubt the reality of the
resurrection will not satisfied, of course, for only if we are resurrected may our
80 Miroslav Volf, Free ofCharge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped ofGrace (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2005), 145.
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faith be rewarded and God's promises kept. Christianity without the resurrection
is also defeated by evil. Without the resurrection, we have no hope that the evils
of the Holocaust, the sex trade or anything else may be redeemed and healed or
God's promises kept.
I must point out something that should be obvious but may not be: If God
sometimes acts unjustly toward those he loves, this does not mean that we may.
When we act unjustly toward others we are not participating with God, but with
Satan in the de-meaning of others and ourselves. Our call is always and
everywhere to seek justice, be merciful and rescue the oppressed. Nor does God
the Father model child abuse in his refusal to rescue Jesus from the cross. In the
coming Kingdom of God which the death and resurrection of Jesus advances,
there will be no child abuse. We must not be complicit in it now, either by
abusing children ourselves or encouraging others to remain in abusive situations
as examples of patience and humility. To justify our own injustice by appealing
to the injustice of God is to misunderstand the Trinity and the mystery of God's
grace and justice. For even in God's injustice toward us, God works mysteriously
to defeat evil; whereas our evil acts oppose God and promote our own
destruction and de-meaning.
On the other hand, the example of Christ and his presence with us does
mean that we need not fear death or horrendous evil. That is, out of love, we
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might take upon ourselves the abuse of the oppressor so that its power can be
nullified through our resurrection. We must not mistake self-sacrifice for self-
abnegation. Self-sacrifice is a free choice of love and hope. Remaining in an
abusive situation is most often not motivated by love, but by fear. The healthy do
not seek to be stepped on. Our non-violent non-resistance is aggressive in its
hope and love, not passive in despair. We must not seek martyrdom. But should
it come to us, we need not fear it, and may even embrace it in joy. So our own
martyrs teach us.
In the end, the difficulty for the theodicist is that God must answer for
God. Too often we act as if we can conjure God's appearance for others, but
when God does not appear when we desire, our fear gets the better of us and we
begin to make excuses for God. Truly, unless one experiences God in Jesus
Christ, Christianity will not make sense. We can invite people into our
communities of love, but we cannot manufacture the experience of God for them.
We simply must wait on God and have faith that he will keep his promises.
Chapter 3: Evil, Atheism and the Problem of Healing
For some, the "problem of evil" is the atheist trump card against
Christianity. Given the quality and quantity of evil in the world, belief in God is
simply impossible, they say. In this chapter, I wish to respond briefly to these
challenges and show how weak they are. In fact, it is Christianity, not atheism,
that offers both a realistic vision of evil and the hope that it may be overcome. In
order to disbelieve in God, atheists must either deny evil or hope, as well as
credible testimonies of healing. This "problem of healing" poses a serious
intellectual challenge to morally sensitive atheists.
In chapter one, I noted William Rowe's argument that the existence of
gratuitous evil contradicts the existence of God. If evil is, as I have argued, in
essence de-meaning, then all evil is gratuitous. The fawn that dies a slow and
painful death alone in the forest dies a meaningless death. This sort of evil is part
of a disordered world that will one day be made right. I do not deny that there
remains some tension for the faithful (as discussed in chapter two), but as far as
the logical problem is concerned, it does not exist.
Let us now consider J. L. Mackie's logic puzzle: "God is omnipotent; God
is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction
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between these three propositions."^^ Alvin Plantinga has already shown that
Mackie fails to show the inherent contradiction and thus belief in God may
remain rational.^^ piantinga's logic is engaging, but there is a simpler way out of
the problem. If the three premises are existentially true, then they must be
logically compatible. Since a faithful Christian has experienced evil and God as
good, loving and all-powerful, then Mackie's premises cannot be logically
contradictory. This will not convince an atheist who has not given his or her life
to God, but it may well do for many believers.
But I want to go further. I want to counter Mackie with a parallel problem.
An atheist also faces a contradiction that is more difficult than the one the
Christian faces. Let's accept the atheist's premise, (1) A loving, all-powerful God
does not exist. Let's also accept the atheist's premise that evil exists. I realize that
the atheist need not accept this premise� in fact many do not. I want to return to
this idea below, but in order to make the contradiction clear, we need to propose
it. However, I want to rephrase the premise. Rather than saying merely that "evil
exists," I want to propose a substitute: (2) Evil threatens both my existence and
the meaning of my life. If evil exists, and if it is gratuitous, as Rowe believes, then
by its very nature it must threaten our existence and meaning. If we only state
81 Mackie, 89.
82 Alvin Plantinga, "The Free Will Defense," in The Problem ofEvil: Selected Readings, ed.
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that evil exists, we might lose sight of what is at stake. Now, the third premise is
this: (3) I have hope that evil may be overcome and my life will have meaning.
Placing them side-by-side, we have:
(1) No loving, all-powerful God exists.
(2) Evil threatens both my existence and the meaning of my life.
(3) I have hope that evil may be overcome and my life will have meaning.
I suggest that all three cannot be true and that the atheist to remain an atheist
must deny either (2) or (3). Hope is never ungrounded� in order to have hope,
one must have the objective possibility that what one hopes may become true.
What I will argue is that atheism has no grounds for hope sufficient to overcome
the threat of horrendous evil.
First, however, I want to revise Mackie's argument to show that for the
Christian, a contradiction no longer exists. Here it is:
(la*) God is omnipotent.
(lb*) God is good.
(2) Evil threatens both my existence and the meaning of my life.
(3) I have hope that evil may be overcome and my life will have meaning.
I believe that I am not being unfair to Mackie to suggest that this is essentially his
argument with the addition of premise (3). But when phrased this way, the
argument takes on a whole new dimension. While this argument does not
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necessarily mitigate any existential suffering, it is logically consistent. For, if
Christianity is true and God is good, loving and all-powerful, then we certainly
ought to hope that evil will be defeated and our lives will have meaning.
I think this brings us closer to seeing why so few Christians actually deny
Mackie's premise that evil exists. Certainly, on logical grounds, this would be the
easiest way out while still preserving a good, omnipotent God. So why are
Christians so loathe to eliminate it? The entire Christian narrative is predicated
on the fact that a loving, all-powerful God is at work in the world to defeat evil.
If a Christian gives up the premise that evil exists and poses a real existential
threat to us, then we must give up Christianity. This premise is as integral to
Christianity as the other ones about the character of God. Place all three premises
together and we come to the heart of the Christian story: there is hope in face of
great evil.
One popular way out of this apparent contradiction is simply to deny that
evil exists. The denial of evil is a necessary consequence of the denial of moral
objectivity, an approach taken by Friedrich Nietzsche and J. L. Mackie. Nietzsche
declared, "there are altogether no moral facts,"^^ and Mackie argued forcefully
83 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The 'Improvers' of Mankind," Twilight of the Idols or, How One
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that "there are no objective values/'^ These premises are necessary in order to
defend the idea that we should create our own ethics. For Nietzsche this meant
rejecting the Christian "slave" morality, whereas Mackie actually wished to keep
most of this morality.^^ But criticizing either of their philosophies of ethics is
beyond the scope of this essay. Instead, I want to focus on what the denial of
moral objectivity does for the idea of evil.
I hold that the denial of any sort of transcendent moral order affirms the
objective victory of evil. Here is why: The atheist certainly does not deny the
existence of meaning. As I have argued in chapter one, humans are meaning-
makers whether or not God exists, and the atheist certainly recognizes this. The
problem for the atheist is not that there is no meaning now; the problem is that
the abyss will be victorious. Consider what the best science teaches us about
naturalistic eschatology: The universe will become uninhabitable; all life will die.
That is to say, one day there will be no more meaning-makers alive.
84 Mackie, }. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), 15.
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With the death of all meaning-makers, comes the death of all meaning.
That is, the history of humanity and of every individual life will no longer hold
any meaning. Everything that once held meaning will be de-meaned. Since I
have argued that de-meaning is a central characteristic of evil, then what
atheistic eschatology guarantees us is the absolute assurance of the objective
victory of evil over all.
Of course the atheist is free to deny that this is evil� that is, the atheist
may deny that anything is evil. It is simply our personal preference or desire that
meaning continue. We must redefine evil to mean that which we do not
personally prefer. I believe this proposal has three serious flaws.
First, it impoverishes language. When people say that something is "evil,"
or "wrong," they mean something more than "I (or we) do not prefer this." We
are, in fact, appealing to a transcendent moral order. Mackie knew that he was
going against the grain and has proposed creative explanations for how this
transcendent appeal might have developed naturally in human societies.^^ In the
end, he must claim that a whole realm of everyday language does not mean what
we think it means. This is not fatal to his project, but it is not very satisfactory.
Second and more threatening for Mackie's denial of a transcendent moral
order is the nearly universal human agreement about the reality and character of
86 Mackie, Ethics, 83ff.
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evil. By appealing to the plurality of visions for the good life, Mackie argued that
the "good," could not be objectively defined. But he did recognize that there was
substantial agreement about "evils"�those things that threaten all competing
visions of the good life. I have argued in chapter one, that de-meaning is the
universal and objective threat to all goods. But Mackie cannot have it both
ways�he cannot hold that good is subjective while evil is objective; he must
either deny evil (as I believe he does) or his rejection of transcendent values may
be called into question. The problem with denying evil is that one must deny that
death is a problem for meaning� that is for all subjective understandings of
good. Because death is an objective fact, I think his denial of evil results in a
refusal to take evil very seriously.
Finally, the future vision of the death of everything coupled with the
inability to take evil seriously has dangerous ethical consequences. What is
needed to stand against the evils of the world is courage, and courage depends
on hope that evil may be overcome. Yet, if atheistic naturalism is right in
believing that all value and meaningwill cease and good and evil are a
projection of our personal preferences, then what grounds courage? Why risk
one's life to rescue children out of prostitution or free the slaves? In the end,
death will swallow everything. Thus, while the denial of evil is not logically
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impossible, it seems to me to amount to a denial of our humanity and a
capitulation to death.
It is more tempting, if not more promising, for the atheist to argue that
other sources of hope are surer than that offered by Christianity. Bertrand
Russell, who I have had occasion to mention earlier, is one atheist who took this
course. Russell was an indefatigable campaigner against evils of his day,
especially war and the threat of nuclear holocaust. He did not deny evil; he took
it seriously enough to oppose it and called upon others to oppose it too.
For Russell, ethics are utilitarian, but not in the sense of "enlightened self-
interest" as Jeremy Bentham would have it, but in the Aristotelian sense that they
are means to achieve goals. Ethics are always "tested by examining whether they
tend to realize ends that we desire."^^ Russell uses desire and rejects oughtness; for
what one "'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire."
Rightness or wrongness has its source in the social order. Yet the social order is
not absolute either. The good life "is inspired by love and guided by
knowledge."^^ Therefore morality "must be examined with a view to seeing
whether it is such as wisdom and benevolence would have decreed."^^ Russell
87 Bertrand Russell, "What I Believe," in The Basic Writings ofBertrand Russell, 1903-1959




leaves room for improving the social order through reform by testing it against
wisdom informed by scientific knowledge.
Russell's hope for a better world was clear: rational thinking by the
educated elite. He believed that scientists not only should, but could "diminish
the magnitude of evil" by providing leadership and directing science toward
beneficial, rather than harmful, purposes.^^ Thanks to scientific thinking, real
moral progress was possible. He proclaimed.
Science can, if it chooses, enable our grandchildren to live the good life, by
giving them knowledge, self-control and characters productive of
harmony rather than strife. At present it is teaching our children to kill
each other, because many men of science are willing to sacrifice the future
of mankind to their own momentary prosperity. But this phase will pass
when men have acquired the same domination over their own passions
that they already have over the physical forces of the external world. Then
at last we shall have won our freedom.^^
It is no surprise that other atheists have taken a similar path. Science is
demonstrably progressive and has brought humanity� or substantial parts of
it� great material blessings. Moreover, science has also been effective at healing
people's bodies and promoting longer life expectancy. Two centuries of
extraordinary scientific progress has encouraged in us a sense that continued
progress is certain and unlimited. Faith in the omnipotence of science is evident
in the atheist Islam's claim that even after the dissolution of super massive black
90 Russell, "The Social Responsibilities of Scientists," in Fact and Fiction (London:
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holes a google years from now, "there will always be... a constantly expanding
domain of life, consciousness and memory."^^
Yet Russell's hopes are misplaced. First and most importantly, Russell has
misunderstood the nature of evil. He certainly believed in its existence, and he
took it seriously, but he failed, it seems, to grasp the full scope of its powers. For
Russell, evil seems to have been that which threatened the good life, as Russell
defined it. This included both external threats, like nuclear war, and also internal
flaws, like ignorance. While this is true insofar as it goes, evil is more threatening
than that� for, in fact, many people have not lived the good life and this means
evil has had the victory in their lives.
Russell was not a relativist despite his claims that ultimately ought and
should were dependent upon a relative social authority. In fact, Russell's works
are filled with all sorts of oughts and shoulds that he posits as if they are universal.
He told educators that "Education ought to foster the wish for truth"'^ ^nd
politicians that "the West ought to alleviate abject poverty."^^ He declared that
we cannot tell the conscientious objector that "he ought not to act as his
92 Islam, 111.
93 Russell, "Education," in The Basic Writings ofBertrand Russell, 1903-1959 (London:
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conscience dictates."^^ Even morality itself "ought not to be such as to make
instinctive happiness impossible."^^ This is not the language of a consistent
relativist. Rather, Russell seems to have believed that philosophical thinking can
get us part way�but only part way� to an objective understanding of reality .^^
I do not wish to argue the idea that once one has accepted the idea of
oughtness (or lives as if one accepts it), then one has moved beyond a strictly
naturalist and godless universe. Better philosophers than I have already done
this, and I find their arguments compelling.^^ What I do wish to show, however,
is that Russell assumes quite correctly that people and their actions have purpose
and meaning. But when evil is understood as meaninglessness, the atheist, like
Russell, has little recourse because meaning depends, not only upon purpose and
will, but on an eternal and personal being who continues to hold it. Since, in
Russell's universe, no such being exists, neither does hope exist.
Russell was certainly committed to human salvation by turning science
and scientific thinking to the promotion of the good life, as he understood it. But
what of all of those who perished without having experienced this goodness?
95 Russell, "Individual and Social Ethics," in The Basic Writings ofBertrand Russell, 1903-
1959 (London: Routledge, 1992), 358.
96 Russell, "What I Believe," 380.
97 Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: Routledge, 1995), 158.
98 See, for example, Mark D. LinviUe, "The Moral Argument," in The Blackwell Companion
to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Chichester: WUey-Blackwell,
2009): 391-448.
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How does the possibiHty that one day all will enjoy a good life redeem the
torture of small children? The atheist can either suggest that the evils that befell
innocent children are either unredeemable or redeemed through the warning
and inspiration they offer us as we work toward creating a Utopian future. If the
former, then we have no ground for hope that good will prevail over past or
most present evil. Tragedy is written in stone. If the latter, then we have merely
turned ourselves into the god who builds a perfect world on the sufferings of
children, a god that Ivan Karamazov rejects.^^ It is one thing to reject the
transcendent and personal God of Christianity as a moral protest against the evil
God permits, but if we are that very same god� the very god that builds a Utopia
on the backs of tortured children� then should not our protest result in a
withdrawal of support from the Utopian project? And if we withdraw support,
then have we not given evil the victory by default?
We have seen already that, for Russell, the highest purpose of humanity
can only be to "cherish lofty thoughts" and to "sustain the world that [our] ideals
of fashioned" though it is, in fact, doomed.^� This is a purpose in which most of
humanity simply cannot take part, and, while it may appeal to our sense of
courage in good times, seems to me to leave one without the sustaining hope to
99 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Gamett (New York:
Signet, 1986), Book V.4, 226.
Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," 47.
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endure evil times. Either we must forget that children are still burned, raped and
hacked apart with machetes or else we must lose hope. In the end. Death will
swallow all and its victory will be eternal.
Russell's hope in science and scientists also seems misplaced. While not as
important for my argument, the idea that a rationalistic, scientific elite can really
drive the establishment of a world of love and peace seems to me to be
unwarranted. I do not wish to deny the possibility that science can make (and
has made) a contribution to a better world, but it seems to me that scientists as a
whole are unlikely to prove to be the world's saviors. Consider today how few
scientists call for any sort of moral restraint in their research. Moreover, I do not
believe that people who live in technologically advanced societies are especially
happy. One need only look at the high rates of mental illness and suicide in the
developed world.
Returning again to my argument, if the atheist wishes to avoid the
contradiction, the best, most honest approach is to deny the third premise: "I
have hope that evil may be overcome and my life will have meaning." Albert
Camus took this approach in his brilliant work. The Plague. Set in Oran during an
outbreak of bubonic plague, the central character. Dr. Rieux struggles to fight
101 por example, in 2000, the suicide rate in Japan was 24.1 per 100,000 while the rate in
France was 18.4 and in the United States, 10.4. But in the developing nations of the Dominican
Republic the rate was only 1.7, and in Haiti, 0.2. See "Suicide Prevention," World Health
Organ iza tion, http ://www . who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/.
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against evil as represented by the plague. Camus, through Rieux, makes it clear
that evil must be opposed, and he criticized attempts to defend the intelligibility
of evil:
What's true of all evils in the world is true of the plague as well. It helps
men to rise above themselves. All the same, when you see the misery it
brings, you'd need to be a madman, or a coward, or stone blind to give in
tamely to the plague.^^^
While good can come out of evil, one should nonetheless, "try to relieve suffering
before trying to point out its excellence."^"^ For Rieux� and Camus� creation as
it is must be fought against. God is rejected because creation is rejected. As Rieux
protests, "since the order of the world is shaped by death, mightn't it be better
for God if we refuse to believe in Him and struggle with all our might against
death, without raising our eyes toward the heaven where He sits in silence."i�*
The doctor is not ignorant of what this means. Because the power of death is
greater than the power of life, Rieux and all those who follow his example must
face "a never ending defeat."^�^
What Camus praises is a certain ethical stance against death. He knows
that many Christians participate in this struggle, and, in fact, the character of
Father Paneloux who originally preached about the plague's meaning ultimately





gives his own life working against it. In one important scene Father Paneloux
and Dr. Rieux engage in a difficult conversation after having together watched a
child die slowly. After some initial sharp words, Rieux, the atheist, affirms
"We're working side by side for something that unites us�beyond blasphemy
and prayers. And it's the only thing that matters."^�^ It is not grace or faith, but
healing that is most important.
One cannot help but admire Camus's portrayal of courage without hope,
as well as his ecumenism in his recognition of ethical solidarity between
believers and non-believers. Nonetheless, I believe his stance is flawed for two
reasons. First, courage without hope is not logical; it is merely a personal
preference, and one that most will not be able to sustain. Second, Rieux' s
defiance is still not meaningful if there is no meaning. In fact, it only makes
sense z/ there is a God who takes an active interest in the world. That is, Rieux's
hopeless struggle against evil and his anger at the silent God that does not exist
still depends upon the existence of that God. To reject belief in God because it is
morally outrageous is to love that very same God. Nor is it possible to sustain
such admirable ethics without a culture that believes that evil must be opposed
and that we had hope in so doing. That is, without Christianity, Camus would
not have had the moral imagination required to write The Plague.
Ibid., 197.
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This does not make Christianity true by default. Atheists are certainly
logically consistent if they wish to deny hope. What it does do is show how
attractive the Christian narrative is. The Christian proclaims that salvation is
possible; the atheist that we must suffer a never-ending defeat. The question then
becomes: is salvation really possible? Does healing in spite of horrendous evil
actually happen? Because if salvation is possible then the atheist has a problem:
the problem of healing. A worldview which either denies evil or denies hope will
not be able to explain it.
Healing in the face of horrendous evil is possible. I turn again to the story
of my friend, Leslie.
Broken, Leslie had finally decided to end her life. She had been abused,
raped, prostituted and almost killed. Yet, she wrote that, "No one, not even my
worst enemy wanted my death more than I wanted it; no one damaged me or
caused me more pain than I inflicted on myself, especially against my body."i�7
She hated her own body; she despised herself. Her emotions were characterized
by fear, anger, guilt, shame, and pain. She used drugs and alcohol to numb the
pain, but found that the pain was always there when she returned. She wrote
that she carried guilt
Harley, Jesus Sabe.
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for the sexual abuse in my childhood; for the rape in my adolescence; for
the physical abuse and attempted murder against me; for having been
rejected by the nuns to enter the convent; for having been an atheist and a
communist; for my bad decisions in choosing partners; for my
promiscuity; for the permanent physical damage I carry in my body from
being abused and raped; for having wasted my talent for throwing
overboard a career and a steady job; for having wasted time on
unproductive and self-destructive activities; for being unable to manage
money and property when I was addicted to drugs; for having aborted my
first child; for hurting so many people; for conceiving my children
without true love; for having used drugs, snuff and alcohol during my
pregnancies; for having worked in prostitution for so many years; for
stealing; for having used drugs to destroy my body; for having hurt my
body in the sex trade; for lying to my family over the years while working
as a prostitute and for leaving my children during those years; for my
attempts at suicide; for failing to build healthy, lasting friendships; and for
preferring to be alone than to risk being hurt.^"^
And of the pain, even years later, she said:
Pain is a feeling that leaves me bedridden and empty-handed. It was
terrible to face my memories: I lost my childhood; I lost my innocence; I
lost my parents; I lost my adolescence; I lost my dreams; I lost my youth;
all lost, lost, lost. . . How can I describe the pain? It is fear, powerlessness,
and anger. It is shame, indifference, and despair. It is the abyss. It is the
thin boundary between continuing the fight to stay alive or surrendering
to seek relief in death.
And so she resolved to kill herself. She was all alone. The appointed day came,
and she called a taxi to take her to the place where she had chosen to die.
And then she remembered her sister who had converted to Christ. She
called her and asked for help. Her sister took her to meet her pastor and Leslie let




dreams, that love [I had secretly longed for] in my sleepless nights and despair,
Christ was my salvation.""^
Her journey of healing had only begun, and even today the pain threatens
to overwhelm her. She characterizes her journey as one being guided by God.
The lies that her "body is crap" and that it "has no value" are broken by the
truths that God made her body good and that he wants to dwell in her body.
Guilt for false sins is countered with the truth that she is only responsible for her
own sins� and for these she knows that God has forgiven her. The fear that her
trauma will still destroy her is met with the truth that, in Christ, nothing evil has
the last word, and that he, too, knows pain, even the pain of having his Father
abandon him in his hour of deepest need."^
She consistently credits the epiphanies and healing moments to the work
of God. Of course her healing is nurtured by a supportive community. Yet, she
feared depending on others. She described how her willingness to dare to trust
others for help came from an experience with God:
Crying in the arms of the Lord I said: "No one will understand me,
nobody cares, nobody is going to love me after coming to know me;
please do not make me ask for help, your help is enough for me." God
kept hugging me and saying something like this to my heart: "The
spiritual life is a reflection of your worldly life; the road must be traveled
in both directions, from your relationships with others into your
� Ibid. Email of 5 August 2010.
"1 Ibid., Jesus Sabe.
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relationship with me and from the privaq^ of our communion to a change
with others. You cannot have one without the other.""^
Her testimony is a story of great healing in the face or horrendous evil, of a life
nearly destroyed, but saved from the brink of the void. The credit she gives for
this healing is first and foremost to the power of God in Jesus Christ. She has
hope in spite of evil which did pose a threat to the meaning of her life and her
very existence.
How can the atheist explain this? There are no moral facts? Certainly such
an assertion is absurd. Rather, if one is raped, abused, prostituted, nearly killed,
and brought to the very brink of suicide, how is denying good and evil any
encouragement? Certainly such a statement would make the world worse, not
better. There is no hope for healing there.
Worship at the shrine that his own hands have built? For a victim of abuse,
terror and fear, what shrine is that? How could this be interpreted as anything
except the worship of Death? For when we suffer horrendous evil at the hands of
men, what other shrine can be imagined? Will scientific and rational thinking
help give the victim the power to experience healing? Yet certainly we would
have had to dismiss as superstition the most incisive and clear-sighted truths that
Leslie experienced in communion with God. Even if we accepted that, by some
chance. Christians had stumbled upon good, sound psychological advice, this
Ibid.
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"advice" is entirely dependent upon the existence of a personal, loving and forgiving
God. Moreover, the atheist would have to tell the victim that, in order to be fully
mature, she must reject the very thing that wrought her healing. This deep
ingratitude seems therapeutically unwise, to say the least.
We are sure to face a never-ending defeat? Is it really possible for most of us to
sustain courage against the darkness without hope? Rieux was part of a
community thatmight stand together against the plague, a community deeply
influenced by Christian ideas of right and wrong. But Leslie was all alone.
Whereas we might be able to stand together� for awhile� if we have each other,
all alone it seems impossible to me. The godlessness of the society which Leslie
inhabited before her conversion did not offer any hope for healing�only another
round of abuse and sorrow.
We could argue that what began Leslie's healing was not God, but the
help of humans and that her journey was abetted by good psychology, whatever
its source. These things are certainly true, but as an explanation they are
completely unconvincing. For Leslie does not believe that any individual person
or any community could have saved her. In fact, she had waited for someone to
come along and save her during her years of misery. According to her, it was
Jesus Christ who rescued her, and it is to him that her gratitude is due. To deny
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the centrality of her faith in God for her healing is to no longer take her seriously
as a witness.
Another option is to take Nietzsche's course and de-mean Leslie. Of the
"ascetic priest/' he said, "He combats only the suffering itself, the discomfiture of
the sufferer, not its cause, not the real sickness.""^ Nietzsche recognized better
than most that the Christian yearning was for meaning. He wrote:
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so
far. His existence on earth contained no goal; "why man at all?"�was a
question without an answer; the will for man and earth was lacking;
behind every great human destiny there sounded as a refrain a yet greater
"in vain!" This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something
was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void�he did not know
how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the
problem of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a
sickly animal: but his problem was not suffering itself, but that there was
no answer to the crying question, "why do I suffer?"
Because this question so haunted us, Nietzsche argued, we gave meaning to our
lives through asceticism� turning our attention inward and bringing "fresh
suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive
suffering.""^ Christianity at its heart expresses,
this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of
happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance.
"3 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals in Basic Writings ofNietzsche, trans, and
ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modem Library, 1992), �3.17, 565-566.
1" Ibid., �3.28, 598.
115 Ibid.
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change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself�all this means� let
us dare to grasp it� a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion
against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains
a will! . . . And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man
would rather will nothingness than not will."^
What Leslie has done by surrendering herself to God is to hate her own body and
life and to will her own destruction.
I hope it is obvious to even the most determined skeptic that this analysis
is absurd. By Leslie's own testimony, it was in life without God that she willed
nothingness and destruction. Her surrender to Jesus Christ has not resulted in
her destruction, but significant progress toward her own healing. She has been
lifted out of the miry pit and now has hope. She claims meaning for her life� a
meaning that is grounded in God's love for her. Nietzsche's analysis fails the
acid test of history: where he sees hatred, Leslie experiences love. Where he sees
fear of happiness and beauty, Leslie experiences courage to accept happiness and
beauty. Where he sees an aversion to life, Leslie experiences life anew. In the end,
Nietzsche died having gone mad, but Leslie lives and is being made well. If some
people really are healed from horrendous evil, then atheism is no longer
believable.
If we take Leslie seriously, then atheism suffers from a difficult logical
problem. She lends credence to the premises that both evil and hope exist and
"6 Ibid., 598-599.
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she shows how these are incompatible with disbelief in God. The atheist can offer
no compelling counter-narrative to substitute for Leslie's own story while
maintaining the premise that God does not exist. If they admit that moral facts
exist independently of the natural world, then they have opened the door to the
divine; if they refuse to believe in evil, then they have closed their ears to the
world's suffering. And if they admit evil, they can offer no ground for hope for
anything better, except the optimistic dreams of well-fed philosophers whose
own sense of right and wrong is deeply indebted to Jesus Christ.
Leslie is not alone. Healing is at the very heart of the Christian story and
an appropriate synonym for salvation. Healing is not simply about making the
body well again (though it is certainly about that), but about restoring the
meaning of one's life. In this sense, of course, Christianity is deeply indebted to
Judaism whose scriptures proclaim a God of healing. Consider how in the
Hebrew scriptures God's healing power is revealed in opening barren wombs. In
so doing, the meaning and blessedness of life is healed in the socio-cultural
context of ancient Israel. Israel's Messiah ought to be a healer� and such is the
claim made by Christians for Jesus Christ. Healing is not only central to his
mission while he lived, but his disciples believed that his healing work continued
into the present because he had been resurrected. In fact, his resurrection is the
"7 See Levenson, 108ff, 142ff.
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ultimate ground of hope that evil will be defeated and that its defeat has already
begun."^
Healing, hope and meaning were and are driving forces for the spread of
Christianity. The power in the Christian faith to effect cures and relief from evil
spirits is what the historian Ramsey MacMullen suggested likely initiated many
into the Christian faith before Constantine."^ Nor was this unique to early
Christianity. In early medieval Europe, the Christian message came with power
to deliver people from evil spirits and to ensure good harvests.^^o jj-^ modern
Nepal, numbers of Christians have grown from twenty-five in 1950 to over
440,000 at the end of the twentieth century. When a Western missionary asked
first generation Christians what brought them to faith, "The most frequent
response was that they had experienced difficulties with demons and had tried
many remedies, even exorcism attempts by Hindu priests, all to no avail." But
converts all "emphasized that it was not so much the act of a person casting a
demon out of them that had brought them to faith as the message of the gospel
"8 See Amanda Porterfield, Healing in the History ofChristianity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), especially chapters 1 and 2.
"9 Ramsey MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400) (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1984), 40-42.
Richard Fletcher, The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to Christianity (New York:
Henry Holt, 1998), 243-245.
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which they believed in their desperation/'^^i Throughout the global South, the
poor "are less than startled at a society ravaged by epidemics and random
violence, deprived of adequate food supplies, unable to trust the drinking water,
subject to ever more oppressive policing and internal security." It is these same
people who also experience the power of the Christian gospel as a force for
liberation and hope.^^^ Atheists who are used to confronting the dying or stunted
Christian faith of wealthy Westerners forget that Christianity has been so
successful because it works. People meet God and are healed.
Most atheists, I suspect, will remain unconvinced, perhaps because they
have not met any who have been healed in light of great evil. It will be easier to
assume that Christianity is a therapeutic placebo, even though such assumptions
betray their own ignorance of evil and refusal to take people at their word.
Nonetheless, the problem of healing remains for the serious and honest atheist
who would remain a logically consistent atheist.
Michael Pocock, Gailyn Van Rheenen, and Douglas McConnell, The Changing Face of
World Missions: Engaging Contemporary Issues and Trends (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005),
193.
122 Philip Jenkins, The New Faces ofChristianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 96.
Chapter 4: Evil and Feminist Theology
In earlier chapters, I have defined the fundamental character of evil as de
meaning and considered the threat that it poses for people of faith and unbelief. I
have argued that death is so de-meaning, that evil can only be defeated with
resurrection, as Christians claim. Yet some people of faith within the Christian
tradition have rejected the traditional claims of the Christian faith. In this
chapter, I intend to offer preliminary criticism of some feminist theologians by
considering how their approach to evil fails to ground final hope for women and
others caught in the sex trade. Instead, I will argue that the gospel of traditional
orthodox Christianity is really "good news" for these women. While there is no
single feminist theology or approach to evil, all feminist theology desires to
promote the liberation of women from arbitrary constraints. The test of this
liberation�and thus feminist theology� is the concrete, lived experience of
women. Women's experiences are necessarily of critical importance to
theological reflection.^^^
Many Christian and post-Christian feminist theologians come from
evangelical or traditional Christian homes, and a growing number of thoughtful
evangelical pastors and theologians encounter feminist thought, both in the
See Natalie K. Watson, Feminist Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 2-3.
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academy as well as in the pews. One area of great concern to both feminist and
evangelical theologians is the problem of evil. Feminists have critiqued
traditional orthodox responses to this problem, but evangelical theologians have
not (to my knowledge) engaged feminist thinkers on this topic.^^^ Not only does
feminist thinking deserve thoughtful criticism, but their criticisms may yield
insights for the whole church, including evangelicals. While it is unlikely that the
great differences between feminist and evangelical theologians will be bridged,
discussion may yet prove fruitful to both parties. In this chapter, I hope to begin
such a scholarly encounter.
There is no one feminist theology of evil, nor are all feminist theologies
irreconcilable with my own. For example, Nel Nodding's understanding of evil
as pain, separation and helplessness has much to commend it, even if I find her
portrayal of Christianity as repressive foreign to my experience.^^^ She assumed
that Christianity is a social construct and not an encounter with a transcendent
God who really is seeking to redeem and heal people. Consequently, my
fundamental issue with her is not how she framed the problem of evil as much as
how she resolved it�or failed to do so. Time and space limitations prevent me
124 Por example, evangelical scholar Michael Peterson's collection of essays on the
problem of evil do not include any feminist theologians. See Michael L. Peterson, The Problem of
Evil: Selected Readings (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
125 Nel Noddings, Women and Evil (Berkeley: U of California Press, 1989).
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from considering Noddings or many other creative feminist thinkers, though I
believe a comprehensive critical treatment of the feminist theology of evil would
be useful.
For this preliminary analysis of evil in feminist theology, I intend to
examine two works: Journeys by Heart: A Christology ofErotic Power by Rita
Nakashima Brock and Proverbs ofAshes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering and the
Search for What Saves Us by Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker. I recognize that Brock
(along with Susan Thistlethwaite) have written specifically and thoughtfully
about the sex trade in Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the
United States (1996). Indeed, reading this book was influential in setting me on a
course to try to help victims of the sex trade. Nonetheless, I will be setting it
aside for this preliminary investigation. In this chapter, I will examine and
critique Brock and Parker's understanding of evil, soteriology and ethics as
reflected in Journeys by Heart and Proverbs ofAshes.
We ought to acknowledge that one of the most important differences
between feminist and traditional orthodox or evangelical theologians is their
approach to Scripture. While feminists who remain Christians do mine the
scriptures for those elements that promote the full dignity of women, a feminist
cannot surrender herself to Scripture, at least not to the extent that an evangelical
can. The primary source for feminist theology is women's experience. When
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these experiences conflict or seem to conflict with what the Scripture teaches,
then the Scripture is understood as an obstacle to the equality or dignity or
humanity of women. Of course, an evangelical may feel the same conflict
between women's experience and the Scriptures, but, because of her
commitment to the Scripture as an authority, the conflict must be lived through
in a way that denies neither the authority of Scripture nor the dignity of women.
I acknowledge that this can be a difficult task, but it is possible to do, as
demonstrated by the example of many fine evangelical or orthodox women
scholars. While my criticisms will from time to time touch on how feminist
theologians interpret Scripture, I include no thorough-going criticism of feminist
hermeneutics� a task that has already been taken up by abler scholars.^^^
Nonetheless, the different approaches to the Scripture will necessarily result in
very different methods and conclusions, though I do not mean to imply that we
cannot learn from each other despite this fundamental difference.
My criticisms ofmy feminist dialogue partners are not primarily over
their use of Scripture but rather are grounded in conflicting understandings of
evil and how it can be defeated. In short, I contend that the theology of Rita
Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Parker does not take evil seriously enough.
126 Por example, see Alvin F. Kimel, Jr., ed.. Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and
the Challenge ofFeminism (Eerdmans, 1992).
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Consequently, their proposed solution is not able to overcome evil or give much
hope for healing.
Brock and Parker diminish evil when they conflate it with "patriarchy."
This conflation diminishes evil for several reasons. First, patriarchy is poorly-
defined and generally viewed through the eyes of victims of abuse, usually
children, and this abuse is often at the hands of men. This viewpoint is helpful
for articulating the power and influence of de-meaning systems, but the result is
a downplaying of human sin for fear of aggravating evil through constraining
concepts of "blame" and "guilt," which are considered patriarchal tools of
control. So while Brock and Parker took systems of evil seriously, their view of
evil is unbalanced because they minimized our personal responsibility for it.
Brock demonstrated sensitivity to how evil can infect systems and
societies. She understood that evil is global in scale and that it seeks to obliterate
the meaning of many, if not most, human lives.^^z Though she knows also that
"patriarchy is not the only cause of human evil and suffering," she focused her
attention on it.^^^ She followed Gerda Lerner in defining patriarchy as "male
dominance over women" in the family and in society. While women need not be
without power or rights, the power differential between men and women means




women are always vulnerable to male abuse.^^^ Moreover, both Brock and
Parker have experienced abuse at the hands of men and worked with women
and children who have experienced abuse. Parker was raped repeatedly as a
child by a neighbor, and her moving testimony illuminates how the devastation
of abuse can influence one's view of what happened between God the Father and
his Son, Jesus Christ on the cross."" Brock and Parker offer trenchant criticism of
the church's complicity in creating a "patriarchal" world where children are
raped.
It is a much needed perspective, but they failed to fully substantiate their
criticism. I wish to tread carefully here because I fear any counter-criticism will
be seen as a vehicle for excusing Christians from reflecting on their own sin and
silence in the face of child abuse and other evils in our society. Moreover, we
who have not experienced abuse need to hear their stories, and as Brock and
Parker recommend, we need to create communities of healing. Yet, I still fear that
Brock and Parker's conflation of evil and patriarchy obscures something about
the nature of evil.
In their thought, patriarchy was equated with dominance, and dominance
was implicitly equated with authority. The result is that there can be no such
129 Ibid., 2.
"0 Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Proverbs ofAshes: Violence, Redemptive
Suffering and the Search for What Saves Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 165ff.
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thing as a benevolent patriarchy; by its very nature patriarchy is domineering
and malevolent. While this may feel true from the perspective of an abused child,
it is not always true. Not every child is abused in a society in which men have
most of the power and authority.
Let's ask it this way: Can a man who has authority over a woman use that
authority for her good? Of course he can. In fact, it happens all of the time in
families and workplaces in Western culture. I myself, as an elite man in a
hierarchal workplace, have used my power to promote the careers and welfare of
women who worked for me (or, in some cases, for whom I worked). Such power
that I held, I used to enhance the responsibilities and freedom of subordinate
women� that is to empower them, not simply paternalistically promote what I
believed to be in their best interest. Nor am I alone; I have seen supervisors
promote the interests of their employees, teachers promote the interests of their
students and fathers promote the interests of their daughters and wives. What
are we to call this? Structurally, these examples are patriarchal because men
hold power and authority over women. Certainly this power could be used to
abuse or restrain these women, but in many cases it is not. Rather, the power
that these "benevolent" men hold is used to serve, empower and promote the
interests of subordinate women. The structure is patriarchal, but I fail to see how
criticisms of dominance apply. Brock and Parker failed to consider such cases.
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A feminist might respond that by working in hierarchal systems, these
"benevolent" men (as well as the women) support a system that ultimately
harms more women than it helps. I concede that this may be true, at least at
times, but is it really possible not to have hierarchies or authorities? Would the
world really be better without families or organizations that possess power and
authority?"^ If such things exist at all, then people will be vulnerable to abuse.
In a world of de facto hierarchy, it seems to me that the best way to improve
women's lives is for those with power to serve and empower those with less. In
fact, authorities that act as servants seem to me to be an essential ingredient in
communities ofmutuality that feminists wish to see transform the world.
Moreover, it is the vision of leadership advocated in the Christian scriptures."^
My point is this: If, in patriarchal or hierarchal contexts where men have
power over subordinate women, these men can and do serve and empower
women, then we have a good state of affairs that resembles patriarchy without the
"dominance" and abuse. In fact, it seems that this is exactly the good state of
affairs that the Christian Scripture promotes. But if such a state of affairs is
possible� and it is, because I have experienced it� then feminists need to
"1 For a provocative criticism of feminist family policy in the United States, see Kay S.
Hymowitz, Marriage and Caste in America: Separate and Unequal Families in a Post-Marital Age
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006).
132 E.g., Matthew 16:24-26, 18:1-5.
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recognize a much more complicated relationship between Christianity and
"patriarchy." I suggest that the images of God as a servantly king and a
motherly Father will do far more to advance the welfare of women in a de facto
"patriarchal" world than images that are unintelligible given the hierarchal
context of both the ancient world and our present one. To be fair, feminists,
including Brock, recognize an "ambivalence" in Scripture regarding "hierarchical
powers.""^
The ethical consequence of conflating authority with its abuse is the denial
of value in the discipline of submission, by which I mean the willingness to yield
one's desires for the sake of another. Of course, a victim of abuse ought not to
submit to her abuser�not in the sense expressed above. Feminists are right to
challenge an understanding of the discipline of submission that urges a person to
more victimization at the hands of an abuser. What feminists are not right to do
is to erase submission from the list of disciplines. Submission is a necessary
companion of love (whether agape or eros) and so will be required in any
community ofmutuality, whether marriage, family, office, church or Sister
Circle. If evangelicals are right to describe the Christian life of faith as the "glad
"3 Brock, Journeys by Heart, 69. My reading of Scripture suggests that hierarchical powers
are embraced and commended when they act as servants, that is, as God acts. Generally,
Scripture casts great suspicion on human hierarchical powers which are usually self-
aggrandizing. It is clear (rather than ambivalent) from Scripture that these worldly powers
cannot save us.
surrender/' then any theology that does away with submission and surrender
will not lead to life.
An additional consequence of conflating authority and abuse is the
downplaying of personal sin� that is, our complicity in the de-meaning of
ourselves or others. Feminists are right to point out that, in some settings, sin and
guilt have added to the pain and misery of women. This is certainly true in
regards to (some) Christian attitudes toward prostitutes. In fact. Brock
acknowledged the reality of sin and recognized that evil "leads us to sin" and
that sin can contribute to evil. Moreover, she rightfully argued that sin is
"something to be healed.""^ Evangelical theologians should agree. Yet, she held
back from recognizing the disobedience of sin and our culpability for it. I
understand that she did this for good therapeutic motives�motives of grace and
not condemnation. However, I fear that a refusal to face our own culpability for
sin or acknowledge that it disrupts our relationship with God (i.e., that we are
disobedient) does not promote our full healing.
The scriptures teach that we ought to confess and repent of our sins."^
Brock argued that "for all of our discussions or pride, evil, alienation, greed,
racism, war, and so on. Christians have not been able to deal fully with the
Brock, Journeys by Heart, 7.
135 E.g. Matthew 3:2, 17; John 8:11; Romans 6:15.
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presence of evil in our own patriarchal hearts.""^ I take this to mean that, in part,
our confession and repentance of sin has not brought about either full healing or
redemption of the world from the evil of "patriarchy." (I find her use of
"patriarchal hearts" here to be a frustratingly obscure signifier.) We must grant
that liberation theologians have quite correctly shown that the evil in our world
is more than our personal sin and that it needs to be confronted by more than
personal confession and repentance. But Brock seemed to suggest that we
should substitute confession and repentance with a "profound
acknowledgement of our primal interrelatedness.""^ While I am certainly not
opposed to greater acknowledgement of our interrelatedness, I fail to see how
this is a more truthful and helpful response than confessing and repenting of our
contribution to evil in the world.
In their Proverbs ofAshes, Brock and Parker discussed several destructive
choices that they have made. Parker especially mourned her abortion, and she
ably showed how her choice to destroy the life in her womb was interrelated to
the choices of others. Parker blamed her theology of sacrifice for crippling her
moral imagination, and thus limiting her "choice" regarding her abortion."^ In so
doing, her abortion became a destructive act (i.e., sin) against herself alone rather
"6 Brock, Journeys by Heart, 8.
137 Ibid.
138 Brock and Parker, 23-26.
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than a destructive act against both herself and her child."^ So while articulating
clearly how her ideas and her husband conspired to trap her into making a
destructive choice, she did not seem able to accept her own responsibility for the
act. As she said, it was simply "the best [she] could do in the circumstances."^^"
I do not wish to downplay the crucial importance of circumstances, and
for all I know, Parker did confess and repent of her destructive choice. My point
is not to promote guilt regarding this specific act but to suggest that full healing
requires us to acknowledge our own participation in the systems of evil in the
world. This is certainly not to deny the existence or importance of de-meaning
systems that constrain our choices, but how can we confront evil if we cannot
even confront our own responsibility for it in our heart? So while we ought to do
much more to oppose evil, it seems to me that we should do no less than confess
and repent of our sin.^^^
"9 Thus she can maintain her commitment to keeping abortion safe and legal and
perpetuate the great ethical paradox of American feminism. Safe and legal abortion permits and
encourages women to destroy the weak and renounce their most essential feminine attribute so
that they can increase their relative power vis-a-vis men, but the very act ofmaking abortion the
woman's choice excuses men from responsibility for childbeariag, increasing their relative
power. Thus even the laudable goals of unlimited abortion License are imdermined. Meanwhile
feminist women are not permitted to fully grieve the life they have destroyed, for such an
admission would challenge the entire project. Cf. Richard Stith, "Her Choice, Her Problem: How
Abortion Empowers Men," First Things 195 (August/September 2009): 7-9.
"0 Brock and Parker, 25.
i� Parker does acknowledge that "we are all trying to recover from living a lie," (Brock
and Parker, 215), so it may be that I have not done justice to her position.
92
Brock clearly wished the church was better than it was. Unfortunately, she
was correct to point out how the church�or its members�have often abetted
the evils of this world. Yet, the church is an easy target� it has such high
standards which are so consistently unmet. This suggests to me that the internal
demons are, in fact, far more difficult to overcome. If so, then Brock's criticism
that the church has not done all it can to deal with the evil in its heart does not
imply we should stop taking that evil in our heart seriously. Confession and
repentance of sin take the evil in our own hearts seriously.
A holistic view of evil requires acknowledging its power to constrain our
choices as well as the contribution our choices make to its power. Criticisms of
evangelicals for focusing solely on personal sin are not unmerited. Brock, Parker
and liberation theologians in general offer a much-needed and important
corrective to the small horizons of many evangelicals. Nonetheless, in their focus
on the evil powers of patriarchy. Brock and Parker downplayed the personal role
that we make in contributing to the destruction of others. Confessing and
repenting of sin is important for women� including victims and survivors of the
sex trade�because women, too, have made destructive choices and turned away
from God. Moreover, men sin against women and one of the first steps to
overcoming evil is for the oppressor to confess and repent of his sin.
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Christians have traditionally held that evil was and is and will be defeated
through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Christian "'answer'
to the 'problem of evil' is," as theologian Kenneth Surin wrote, "the hesitant,
stammering bringing of this reconciling action to speech."^^ Given the mystery
of Christ's work on the cross, our theology ought to reflect a good measure of
humility. Yet, as we hesitate and stammer our way toward a theology of the
atonement (and our consequent gratitude), we must acknowledge that some
things we could say about the death and resurrection of Jesus are better than
other things. Since the doctrine of atonement stands at the center of our Christian
"answer" to the problem of evil and since Brock and Parker were primarily
concerned with its soteriology in their works, we must now turn our attention to
the work of Christ.
Both Brock and Parker offered sustained criticisms of traditional Christian
soteriology, especially in regards to the meaning of the cross. While they claimed
that all traditional theories of atonement are unsatisfactory. Brock and Parker
were most disturbed by the popular idea that Jesus had to die in order to satisfy
the angry Father so as to turn away his wrath from humankind. Parker argued:
Do we really believe that God is appeased by cruelty, and wants nothing
more than our obedience? It becomes imperative that we ask this question
when we examine how theology sanctions human cruelty. If God is
i� Surin, 143.
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imagined as a fatherly torturer, earthly parents are also justified, perhaps
even required, to teach through violence. . . . The child or the spouse who
believes that obedience is what God wants may put up with physical or
sexual abuse in an effort to be a good Christian.
Parker knew from experience people who had extended their own victimization
in order to be good Christians. Her criticism of the sacrificial view of atonement
stemmed from her pastoral concern.
In her effort to formulate a feminist Christology, Brock similarly argued
that the patriarchal family has thoroughly distorted our view of God. She took
issue with an omnipotent father-god who "fosters dependence" as well as the
abusive "parent-child fusion" that classical Trinitarian thought is said to
reflect. ^"^^ In regard to traditional understandings of atonement, she stated:
Such doctrines of salvation reflect by analogy, I believe, images of
the neglect of children or, even worse, child abuse, making it acceptable as
divine behavior� cosmic child abuse, as it were. The father allows, or
even inflicts, the death of his only perfect son. The emphasis is on the
goodness and power of the father and the unworthiness and
powerlessness of his children, so that the father's punishment is just, and
children are to blame. While atonement doctrines emphasize the father's
grace and forgiveness, making it seem as if he accepts all persons whole
without the demand that they be good and free of sin, such acceptance is
contingent upon the suffering of the one perfect child.^^^
Brock allowed that such a theology can produce graciousness in individuals. She
contended, however, that these doctrines do nothing to reform the patriarchal
Brock and Parker, 31.
Brock, Journeys by Heart, 54-55.
145 Ibid., 56.
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model of the family and thus perpetuate abuse of children and wives. Suffering
is thus "built into the social structures.''^^^
I have already argued above that I find Brock and Parker's understanding
of patriarchy and evil to be vague, unconvincing and incomplete. Here, I want to
take issue with their criticism of the traditional doctrine of atonement. But before
I do, we need to acknowledge that their criticism is not groundless. For those that
have been abused, especially at the hands of their fathers, seeing God the Father
as a cosmic child-abuser makes some sense, especially in light of sacrificial views
of atonement. We should acknowledge that this critique does cast doubt on any
view of the cross in which Jesus appeases an angry or bloodthirsty God, and our
preaching ought to reflect the sensitivity to which Brock and Parker call us.
While I do not wish to deny these pastoral insights, I find Brock and Parker's
treatment of traditional Christology problematic for two reasons. First, their
argument seems to assume that the Christian God is a projection of our own
patriarchal vision. Second, their simplification of the Christian doctrine of
atonement into cosmic child-abuse is unscriptural, and thus an unfair
representation of what Christianity has taught about the atonement.
Brock asserted that the image of God the Father derives from a "nostalgic
longing" for the "nurturing, intimate father" that is "absent in patriarchal
146 Ibid., 57.
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society."i47 Because this imagined divine father's love is "largely unreal/'
Christian thinkers have developed the "doctrines of divine apatheia and [...] the
assertion that the highest love is agape, a love based on objective dispassion."^^
At its heart. Christian theology results from the misguided "nostalgia of abused
children" who seek to "realize mutuality and interdependence" by "being
subject to unilateral power/'^*^ Any reluctance to give up such nostalgia (from,
say, evangelicals) grows out of our lack of honesty "about [our] experiences in
patriarchal society/'"" An honest evaluation of our nostalgia will reveal what is
missing: "interdependence� the intimacy, respect, and love necessary to loving
the whole and compassionate being that comes from connectedness/'"^ Thus,
Brock argued that the traditional understanding of God is ultimately a projection
of the God we wished exist, given our experience of abuse. She advocated a
radical reevaluation of God, Christ and what it means to be saved.
In this way, her work bears some resemblance to the 19* century liberal
thinker Ludwig Feuerbach who argued that we projected our image of ourselves







Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self-
knowledge. By his God thou knowest the man, and by the man his God;
the two are identical. Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and soul;
and conversely, God is the manifested inward nature, the expressed self of
a man.... [...] Hence the historical progress of religion consists in this: that
what by an earlier religion was regarded as objective, is now recognised as
subjective; that is, what was formerly contemplated and worshipped as
God is now perceived to be something human. What was at first religion
becomes at a later period idolatry; man is seen to have adored his own
nature. Man has given objectivity to himself, but has not recognised the
object as his own nature: a later religion takes this forward step; every
advance in religion is therefore a deeper self-knowledge."^
Brock and Parker, like Feuerbach, genuinely wish for progress in religion; for
Brock and Parker, the desire is for a religion that envisions and promotes a world
of mutuality and interdependence. The Trinity is too patriarchal, too ripe for
misuse� it is, in fact, "unholy," as Brock put it."^ Thus, they argued that
traditional Christian doctrines must be replaced with feminist Christian ones.
Ironically, I find there is a certain patronizing quality in the implication
that most of us have created a god of our own imagining and we would do better
with the god that Brock imagined for us. I do not want to deny that there is no
temptation to create our own gods after our own image� the Christian Scripture
teaches that this is so�yet. Brock seemed to suggest that there really is nothing
(or nothing much) out there with whom to relate. This seems to contradict the
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans, from the 2"^ German ed. by-
Marian Evans (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1855), 33. Available online at
http://books.google.com/books?id=Lsvo-mgtucOC&dq.
153 Brock, Journeys hy Heart, xii.
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historical experiences of hundreds ofmillions of Christians (not to mention
adherents to other faiths). Was the Trinity to whom Saint Patrick prayed day and
night while a child-slave in Ireland a nostalgic patriarchal projection? If so, then
why send Patrick back to Ireland to risk re-enslavement after having freed
him?"^ Or how should we think of the millions of low-class Romans who first
converted to Christianity in the first centuries? Did they replace their imagined
gods with an improved imagined God? Or did they encounter a real presence, a
power that healed their diseases or aided them in distress as their testimonies
indicate?"^ Did my friend Leslie conjure up an imagined Jesus coming to rescue
her on the day she decided to kill herself? Can we really credit an imagined,
nostalgic projection with the successful growth of Christianity throughout the
ages? Why then the consistent testimony across time and cultures that Christians
have encountered Jesus Christ risen from the dead?"^ Can Feuerbach really
account for the persuasive power of Christianity? I belabor this point because it
Saint Patrick, The Confession ofSt. Patrick, stanzas 16-23, in The Confession ofSt. Patrick
and the Letter to Coroticus, trans, with notes by John Skinner (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 38-45.
155 Cf . MacMullen, 39-42. MacMullen concludes his discussion on the conversion of
millions of Romans before Constantine: "The explicit record at important points fits badly with
what are, to ourselves, entirely natural expectations. The record and the expectations I have tiled
to compare in this chapter; but we must, of course, favor the former."
156 Cf. John A. T. Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1977), 127.
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does not seem to me at all likely that we can explain the totality of the Christian
experience if we believe in gods of our own imagination."^
Perhaps I have misread Brock and Parker; perhaps they do confess a
transcendent God but merely emphasized divine immanence. If so, their vision
of God as the cosmic child-abuser does not do justice to the testimony of Jesus
and his followers found in Scripture. Jesus taught that his Father was eager to
receive, heal and save those who sought him. We, however, are not eager to seek
God, and our refusal to do so endangers us, not because God is greedy for
worship, but because our sin is destructive and God will one day make the world
right. "^ Moreover, the Trinitarian images that Brock attacked as demonstrating a
"fusion" similar to that between an abuser and victim"^ are better read as the
foundation for all mutuality and interdependence. It is understandable why
some victims of abuse might read the scriptures cynically, but I do not see why
we must accede to that interpretation. Abuse is so disruptive of healthy
relationships that is seems far better for the church to read the scriptures in a
way that is faithful to the testimony recorded therein. The twentieth century saw
For a modem philosophical argument for the existence of God from religious
experience, see Kai-Man Kwan, "The Argument from Religious Experience," in The Blackwell
Companion to Natural Theology, eds. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Blackwell, 2009): 498-
552.
158 E.g. Matthew 8:5ff, 18:10ff, 20:29ff, 22:lff.
159 Brock, Journeys by Heart, 54.
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a revival of interest in the Trinity and one of the most natural consequences is to
understand the Trinity as the foundation for communities ofmutuality,
interdependence and love�exactly the sort of communities that feminists want
to advance.^^� Moreover, I do not see how Brock can claim Scripture for a feminist
Christianity if she reads abuse into and against the natural reading of the text. It
seems wiser to either embrace the Trinity as the source and goal of feminist
theology or to reject the scriptures and Christianity altogether.
Traditional Christian theology claims that through the death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ, evil has been and will be defeated in the world.
Brock and Parker claimed that this theology perpetuates the evils of patriarchy�
especially child abuse� in the world today. Because Brock and Parker seem to
believe that god is, ultimately, a projection of our nostalgic wishes, rather than a
real being we encounter, they were able to read into and against Scripture an
image of an angry father-god who abuses his passive sacrificial son. While their
analysis is certainly useful pastorally, I do not think that they have succeeded in
defeating the traditional views of the atonement. In order to make their claims,
they must reject the testimony of hundreds of millions of Christians, from the
authors of Scripture to the present, across time and cultures. This seems a very
See, for example, Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life
(San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).
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high price to pay in order to be pastorally sensitive to the abused within our
pews, especially since many other grieving people�including victims of abuse
such as my friend Leslie�have found comfort and some measure of healing in a
relationship with the suffering and living Christ of Scripture and tradition.
I have examined Brock and Parker's Christological criticisms because, for
the Christian, Jesus Christ is the final "answer" we have to the "problem" of evil.
We claim that, through Christ's death and resurrection, our lives can be given
meaning despite the existence of evil in the world. If evil de-means us, through
Christ, our lives can be made whole again. Brock and Parker disagree. I want to
turn attention to their constructive counter-proposal. How might we defeat evil,
if Christ has not done it?
In the works of Brock and Parker, Jesus Christ does not save us, though he
does help point the way. According to Brock, we are saved by "erotic power,"
which she defined, following Haunani-Kay Trask, as
...the "life-force," the unique human energy which springs from the desire
for existence with meaning, for a consciousness informed by feeling, for
experience that integrates the sensual and the rational, the spiritual and
the political. In the feminist vision, Eros is both love and power."^
See also Immaculee Ilibagiza, Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust,
with Steve Irwin (Carlsbad: Hay House, 2006); C. S. Lewis, A GriefObserved, foreword by
Madeleine L'Engle (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1989); and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Lament
for a Son (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987). I do not wish to minimize the tragic quality of evil or
abuse. Many others have lost faith.
162 Brock, Journeys by Heart, 25, citing Haunani-Kay Trask, Eros and Power: The Promise of
Feminist Theory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 92-93.
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This power, repressed by patriarchy, is not primarily about cause and effect, but
about the interrelatedness of our very being. It "involves the whole person in
relationships of self-awareness, vulnerability, openness, and caring."^^ It is also
the source of Jesus' power to love others� a source rooted in the communities
that loved and reared him. Jesus' own work is not that of the singular hero, but
that of the "erotic power within the Christa/Community."^^ In fact, this erotic
power is the essential divine energy at work healing broken-heartedness.
In this view, of course, the crucifixion of Jesus was tragic because it was
entirely unnecessary."^ Erotic power grows from life, not death. To claim that his
death was good is to say that "state terrorism is a good thing, that torture and
murder are the will of God.""^ The resurrection was not an objective raising of
Christ from the dead, but the community's affirmation of the erotic power within
the community� a community that would survive Jesus' death because they
refused to let "go of their relationships to each other." Jesus is "brought back,"
not by the power of God, but by the community's "memory and visionary-
ecstatic image of resurrection.""^
Brock, Journeys by Heart, 26.
Ibid., 66-67. Quote from p. 67.
165 Ibid., 93.
166 Brock and Parker, 49.
167 Brock, Journeys by Heart, 97, 100. Quotes from p. 100.
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This erotic power felt in each other through the tragedy of Jesus' death
and remembered through their "visionary-ecstatic image of resurrection" is
sufficient to ground the "call to wholehearted discipleship.""* The
"Christa/Community" perpetuates erotic power in the world. Remembering
Jesus, we become Christ as we "stand in solidarity with all who suffer" and
"confront and feel deeply the tragic loss of all who suffer and die." In this way,
the broken-hearted may be healed."^
I believe this re-visioning of Christianity to be untenable. First, it suggests
that ultimately we save ourselves, a suggestion I believe to be unrealistic. Second,
it depends on an imaginary history. Third, it does nothing about the de-meaning
quality of death. Fourth, it deprives people of an eschatological hope necessary
for sustained ethical commitment. If the Christian revelation is true, I contend
that the traditional interpretations of Christ's life, death and resurrection to be a
far superior response to the problem of evil and de-meaning.
I find Brock's articulation of erotic power to be frustratingly ephemeral,
though perhaps this reveals my own limitations of understanding. What I do
find unconvincing, however, is that this "divine" energy is fundamentally




living God, but from our being-in-relationship. If so, then it will really be up to
us to increase its influence in the world. I appreciate the urgency that lends to
ethics of liberation, but, if true, I am highly dubious humanity will ever be
successful at creating a world of whole-hearted love without divine intervention.
It seems that history shows us that we, as a species, can barely find the internal
erotic power to keep civilization from plunging into barbarism and destruction.
Though I do acknowledge that innate human goodness can resist evil to an
extent, I am more sympathetic to the notion that it is God's grace which is
responsible for the survival of humankind to date, not our own erotic power.
Perhaps my first objection is fundamentally an intuition: I simply do not feel that
we can make ourselves better without divine aid. Those who do not share my
intuition may find Brock more convincing.
Brock's contention that the Christa/Community raised Jesus from the dead
in their memory and through an ecstatic vision runs counter to all scriptural
testimony. The confession of Christ's death and resurrection found in 1
Corinthians 15:3-5 is widely agreed to come from the very early church. The
testimony found in the gospels all points to the belief that the earliest community
did not simply "remember" Jesus or have an "ecstatic vision" of him, but
believed that he had been brought back to life by God. Moreover the hypothesis
that a demoralized community could have had such detailed group visionary
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experiences (that they all interpreted as real rather than as a dream or spiritual
vision) is simply unbelievable. No modern psychological theory could explain
such an event.^''" It is certainly possible to reject the resurrection as ahistorical,
but it seems far safer simply to reject the scriptures altogether. To argue that,
despite its consistent testimony otherwise, the scriptures really do not mean
Jesus rose from the dead does injustice to the text and the original authors. Since
Brock was unwilling to call the authors liars, she must instead patronize them.
Her assumption that no physical resurrection took place is not based on the
actual historical testimony, but, in all likelihood, on her materialistic
assumptions. The authors of Scripture are united in their testimony that Jesus
was raised by the power of the living God. Thus, there is no historical basis for
her interpretation of erotic power in the earliest Christian community; she has
simply imagined it.
If evil is, as I have suggested, de-meaning, then the greatest evil is death.
As I have argued in earlier chapters, in this world, death appears to devour all
meaning. Existentially, we struggle to find meaning in the deaths of those whom
we love, but these struggles pale in comparison to efforts to seek meaning in
events of great death such as the Holocaust or Rwandan genocide. Moreover,
� Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, "The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative
Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth," in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology,
604, 623.
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modem science teaches that one day the earth will become inhospitable to life.
And after the earth, the solar system and eventually the entire universe will fade
into darkness. Death will devour us all. Once no one is left to remember, then the
universe will have been de-meaned, unless, of course, Jesus Christ was
resurrected. While Brock and Parker's efforts to promote hope in the face of the
final death and de-meaning are commendable, they seem misplaced. If love
really is grounded in human interrelatedness, then love is doomed.
Because Brock and Parker deny the reality of the resurrection, their final
hope�or eschatology� is significantly constrained. It does seem that Brock and
Parker believe in something after this life, but their eschatological hope is for a
post-patriarchal future ofmutuality and love. I agree that is certainly something
to work for, but without the resurrection, or divine assistance for that matter, this
eschatological hope seems rather far-fetched. The Christian who believes that we
will all be resurrected knows that in the end what we do here really matters. But if
my great goal is a post-patriarchal world that is so far in the future as to be
almost unimaginable, why spend my life for its sake? I do not see how a vision of
erotic power can ground the hope necessary to sustain lifelong solidarity with
the oppressed. But, if Christ suffered, died and rose again, then I can be assured
that my efforts to love and stand beside others�empowered by the Holy Spirit�
are worth it.
107
Finally, Brock and Parker can only offer mutual relationship to the
broken-hearted. Of course, I agree that we must create communities ofmutuality,
grace and healing� that this is part of our Christian commitment. But because
Brock does not appear to believe that the divine is anything beyond a human life-
force, she cannot offer anything more. For all of the church's sins, hypocrisies
and mistakes, surely our greatest treasure is our relationship with the living
Triune God. The testimony of millions affirm this. Today, Christianity is
spreading rapidly in parts of the world where people live in great material want
and daily face evil that would de-mean their lives.^^^ The message that drives the
growth of the Christian religion is that one may know God. I confess I long for
deep communities ofmutuality and love, but I also long for the love of God.
Humanity is not enough. If, in the person of Jesus Christ, we really have
encountered God with us, then feminist theologians do the oppressed and
abused a disservice by denying them a relationship with this God.
I have found significant fault with the Christian feminist theology of Rita
Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Parker. While I believe that evangelicals have
much to learn from them and other feminist and liberation theologians, I have
argued that Brock and Parker failed to take evil seriously enough. This is evident
Cf. Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming ofGlobal Christianity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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by a downplaying of individual human contributions to evil (i.e., sin) as well as a
re-visioned Christology that ultimately posits we can save ourselves. While I
commend their deep and good desire to stand with the oppressed, I maintain
that they withhold important resources to sustain the struggle for the reign of
God. The poor, abused and oppressed need divine aid and an eschatological
hope that will ground their struggle for healing and meaning. Most of all they
need� and I need� a relationship with the living God, not a pale, imagined
substitute. The life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is good news�not for
the rich, but for the poor, abused and oppressed of the earth. May we remain
faithful to this gospel.
Chapter 5: Evil and the Christian Mission to Prostitutes
In writing about evil and the challenges it poses to Christians, atheists and
some feminists, I have frequently referred to the sex trade as an example of de
meaning and horrendous evil. It should be evident from these discussions that
differing understandings of evil have different ethical consequences. In this final
chapter, I intend to consider some of these ethical consequences for both
Christians engaged in the mission to prostitutes and opponents of this mission
who have a very different understanding of evil and salvation. While we
Christians have some things to learn from our opponents, I hope to show that the
Christian narrative of salvation takes evil more seriously and offers more hope
for healing then the narrative proposed by our critics.
In 2009, 1 attended the International Christian Alliance on Prostitution's
regional conference in Costa Rica. My friends and I had just begun modest efforts
to help prostitutes in Jarabacoa, our mountain town of 60,000 or so in the
Dominican Republic. At the conference, Lauran Bethell, a key leader in the
Alliance, told us that the Holy Spirit was raising up people all over the world to
reach out to women, children and men in prostitution, a remark which explained
both the diversity present in the room as well as my own presence there. Like
many others in the Christian mission to prostitutes, my own involvement is not
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the result of a logical or efficient application ofmy skill set to a specific problem,
but rather my faltering attempt to respond to the invitation to join Jesus Christ in
his mission to a people that is very precious to him.
While the Christianmission to prostitutes began with Jesus Christ himself,
globalization has lent a new urgency to the invitation. The "flattening" of the
world, as Thomas L. Friedman called it,^^^ has not only benefitted productive
commerce, but it has also allowed criminal networks to operate with greater
freedom and viciousness. Trafficking in drugs, weapons and humans is not only
interrelated globally, but has deep ties to licit commerce as well. For most people,
crime, not terrorism, poses a greater threat to their livelihood and very lives.^^^
Mexico offers an especially clear example of the power of organized crime where
drug cartels not infrequently send "heavily armed battalions to attack police
stations and [assassinate] police officers, government officials and journalists."^^^
This violence takes its toll on Mexican society, encouraging a culture where, as
Mexican novelist Mario Bellatin said, "It's as if the whole country were made up
of people who rent and people who are rented, as if one half of society has
contracted the other to carry out the role ofmutilated corpse, hit man, corrupt
172 See Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A BriefHistory of the Twenty-First Century,
updated and expanded ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).
173 See Glenny, McMafia and McGill, Human Traffic.
174 Shannon O'Neil, "The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug
Cartels," Foreign Affairs 88 (July/August 2009): 63.
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official or missing woman/'^^^ The church ought to be concerned about the
increasing power of organized crime.
I have a friend in Mexico who rescues girls out of prostitution and is
convinced that eventually the mafia will come for him and kill him. Most
Western Christian protest has been directed against governments, and more
recently, large corporations, and with merit. Western Christians are not yet used
to thinking of organized crime as one of the "powers" arrayed against the
kingdom of God, but soonwill be. I propose that the sex trade represents one of
the great evils of our age� one of the "spiritual forces of evil" with which we
struggle.^7^ Some within the church have always and continue to confront the evil
within the sex trade and offer hope and healing to the many people broken and
de-meaned by its power. It is important for the whole church to support this
crucial effort.
While the church has always had a mission to proclaim salvation to
prostitutes. Christians are not the only ones with a narrative of salvation. Some
within the secular Western academy also have a story of salvation which is at
odds with the Christian story. In this chapter, I have set myself two tasks: First,
to summarize and criticize the secular academy's "redefinitional" narrative of
Mario Bellatin, "Human Currency in Mexico's Drug Trade," translated by Kurt
Hollander, The New York Times, 27 March 2010 online; 28 March 2010 in print in the New York ed.
176 Ephesians 6:12.
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salvation for prostitutes and, second, to highlight some emphases of the
Christian salvation narrative that the church must remember in its mission to
prostitutes.
As I argued in the first chapter, one function of evil is to constrict freedom.
Of course no one is perfectly free�we are all constrained by our contexts. But a
free person is able to choose among various life-affirming activities. Evil limits
these options. Addictions to harmful substances, for example, are evil because it
becomes more and more difficult for a person to make life-affirming choices. In
other evil systems� such as war, genocide or persecution� a person's only life-
affirming choice may mean death for herself or others. Forces that constrict
freedom for women, men and children in the sex trade may include social
stigma, poverty and lack of opportunities, concern for safety and care of children
or other family members, poor coping skills resulting from past trauma, drug or
alcohol addiction, fear of harm and actual harm�beatings, rape, torture� should
she fail to obey her controller, and despair. Typically we call someone whose
freedom is so constricted a victim, a word which is supposed to connote the
moral condemnation of the constricting circumstances and the moral innocence
of the victim. Moreover, victimhood creates certain moral obligations for other
third parties� the obligation to rescue. We shall see, however, that the ideas of
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victim and rescue are part of the contested salvation narratives surrounding
prostitution.
Evil is the great test of every worldview. Every salvation narrative must
help us both take the power of evil seriously and give us hope that evil can and
will be defeated. Any salvation story which fails in either of these tasks is not
salvation at all. In fact, only a salvation story that takes evil with utmost
seriousness can defeat it. This is exactly what the Christian gospel does. Only
Christ's own death can overcome evil and death in a resurrection that envelopes
us in a new creation and a new life. Twenty centuries of theological reflection
have not quite enabled us to say exactly how God saves, but the church
nonetheless continues to proclaim and experience God's salvation.
Christians are not the only ones with a mission to prostitutes. Many
Hindus, Buddhists, communists, and post-Christians are deeply concerned about
women in prostitution and take action to help them. For example, Anuradha
Koirala, a Hindu, and her group Maiti Nepal "rescue and rehabilitate" victims
and survivors of the sex trade and trafficking in Nepal and India.^^^ In the West,
the most vocal post-Christian critics of the sex trade are feminists. In fact.
See Jerry L. Walls, "Outrageous Evil and the Hope of Healing: Our Practical Options,"
in Immersed in the Life ofCod: The Healing Resources of the Christian Faith: Essays in Honor ofWilliam
J. Abraham (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008): 186-201.
Ebonne Ruffins, "Rescuing Girls from Sex Slavery," CNN Heroes, 30 April 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010A.IVlNG/04/29/cTmheroes.koirala.nepal/ (accessed 30 April 2010).
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Christians share with these other opponents of prostitution�especially post-
Christian feminists� a similar salvation narrative. Both Christians and feminists
believe that the objectification of women and others in prostitution is de
meaning. Both understand that women in prostitution have very limited options
and are often enslaved. Both acknowledge that most, if not all, prostitutes do not
deserve moral condemnation, but rather help. Yet post-Christian feminists are
extremely wary of Christian churches, and look to form alliances with other
organizations that typically fall along the political Left, though in this they are
often disappointed.^^^
Despite many shared values and beliefs, the Christian salvation narrative
is different from the narrative proclaimed by others seeking to rescue prostitutes.
The most important difference, of course, is that Christians proclaim the saving
power of Jesus Christ. Yet, in many ways the mission to prostitutes of Christians
and others can offer mutual support because their goals overlap. But there is
another salvation narrative that is hostile to all of these efforts, whether
motivated by religious or feminist concerns. It is this alternative and hostile
narrative that I wish to consider here.
See, for example, D. A. Clarke, "Prostitution for Everyone: Feminism, Globalisation,
and the 'Sex' Industry," in Not for Sale: Feminists Resisting Prostitution and Pornography, eds.
Christine Stark and Rebecca Whisnant (North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 2004), 157.
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This alternative narrative is a product of the Western academy and looks
to empower prostitutes by redefining prostitution as sex work, thereby raising sex
worker's social status and dignifying them with protections other workers
receive. Because of its emphasis on redefining sex work, I will call this alternative
narrative, the "redefinitional narrative." At its heart, the redefinitional narrative
rejects the idea that (most) prostitutes are victims in need of rescue. What sex
workers do need are safer and freer working conditions as well as social respect.
The redefinitional narrative rests on three ideas: (1) that prostitution is a kind of
work, (2) that sex work is (usually) chosen, and (3) that we ought to listen to the
voices of sex workers and support their working goals, rather than "rescue"
them. Advocates for this narrative, such as Cheryl Overs of the Network of Sex
Work Projects, desire the decriminalization and legalization of all aspects of
prostitution, including child prostitution.""
The redefinitional strategy begins by redefining prostitution as sex work.
Kamala Kempadoo, a leading scholar of prostitution, followed Than-Dam
Troung in arguing that prostitution is a form of work. Troung and Kempadoo
defined work as "the way in which basic needs are met and human life produced
and reproduced." Because sex fulfills basic human needs for pleasure and
Jo Doezema, "International Activism: Interviews NWSP Coordinator, Cheryl Overs,"
in Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition, eds. Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema
(New York: Routledge, 1998), 208. Not all advocates desire the decriminalization of child
prostitution.
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procreation, it is therefore work. Moreover, all work involves specific parts of
the body, just as sexual labor does. Finally, sexual labor is socially constructed�
there is no one "right" way to go about it. Kempadoo argued that "sexual labor
has been organized for the re-creation and replenishment of human and social
life" through "wet-nursing, temple prostitution, 'breeding' under slavery,
surrogate child-bearing, donor sex, commercial sex and biological
reproduction.""^ Because commercial sex is a form of work it ought to be
divorced from the idea that sex and love ought to be conjoined. In fact, any such
moral position represents an "essentialist cultural interpretation... imposed
upon" the sex worker."^ Many within the sex industry, even children, are able to
distinguish between sex as work and sex as an expression of affection; thus, we
should respect this distinction."^ Recognizing sexual labor for what it is will
allow women to make gains for equality in an industry that currently privileges
men as well as giving all sex workers the protections that normally apply for
workplaces.
Kamala Kempadoo, "Introduction: Globalizing Sex-Workers Rights," in Global Sex
Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition, eds. Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema (New York:
Routledge, 1998), 4.
182 Ibid., 5.
183 Ibid., 5, 7. See also Heather Montgomery, "Children, Prostitution, and Identity: A Case
Study from a Tourist Resort in Thailand" in the same volume.
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Legitimizing sex work also requires us to acknowledge the agency of sex
workers themselves. To this end, sex worker advocates emphasize and respect
the choices of sex workers. Kempadoo, following scholars Judith Kegan Gardiner
and Wendy Chapkis, understood the recognition of women's agency to be
essential for feminist thought and practice. She and Cheryl Overs chastised
other feminists who fail to applaud those sex workers who seek to reform the sex
industry rather than abolish it. These feminists are "anti-sex" moralists and
"puritans" producing "drivel about sexual slavery.""^ That is, Kempadoo and
her friends accused anti-prostitution feminists of being nearly identical to the
Christian mission to prostitutes, though anti-prostitution feminists deny this."^
The essence of the critique is that anti-prostitution feminists (and Christians,
assumedly) continue to see sex workers as objects ("victims") and not human
agents.^^'' Redefining and legitimizing sex work ought to be integral to the
feminist agenda.
Kempadoo, "Introduction: Globalizing Sex-Workers Rights," 9. See also Judith Kegan
Gardiner, Provoking Agents: Gender and Agency in Theory and Practice (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1995), 9, and Wendy Chapkis, Live Sex Acts: Women Performing Erotic Labor (New
York: Routledge, 1997), 29-30.
185 Doezema, "International Activism: Interviews NWSP Coordinator, Cheryl Overs,"
203-206.
186 Por example, see Clarke, 191.
Kempadoo, "Introduction: Globalizing Sex-Workers Rights," 9.
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As part of their effort to show that sex workers freely choose their work,
redefinitional advocates challenge prevailing assumptions about the "forced"
nature of prostitution. Australian researcher and sex worker Alison Murray
suggested that very little work in the sex trade involves trafficking, slavery or
child prostitution. Rather these terms are used by "extremists" such as the
(secular, feminist) Coalition against Trafficking in Women (CATW) in their
efforts to win support for ending the trade."^ Murray acknowledged that when
sex workers have been forced into the trade, they ought to be helped, but she
wanted "abolitionists" to hear "that most sex workers...do their job willingly
and do very well out of it relative to other occupations.""^ Generally, sex worker
organizations and their allies have succeeded in differentiating between
voluntary and forced prostitution; many government agencies and non
governmental organizations now recognize this difference. Yet, drawing
distinctions between voluntary and forced prostitution can be difficult. For
example, a woman may be forced into prostitution initially, but remain in it
voluntarily, and some women are trafficked overseas knowing that they will
work as prostitutes. Distinguishing between voluntary and forced prostitution
Alison Murray, "Debt-Bondage and Trafficking: Don't Believe the Hype," in Global Sex




also encourages the assumption thatWestern sex workers have agency while sex
workers in developing nations are passive dupes. But the most pressing
difficulty the distinction poses for sex worker advocates is that it divides
prostitutes into the guilty and innocent. Society helps those deemed innocent,
but ignores or damns the guilty.^^"
The idea that prostitution, if consensual, is a "victimless" crime is popular.
Whenever anti-prostitution advocates or officials try to argue that the sex trade
demeans women, a well-educated and self-confident prostitute can be found to
cast doubt on these arguments, as happened in 2010 on Fox's John Stossel Show.^^'^
The redefinitional narrative has had some success in marginalizing anti-
prostitution feminists from American policy debates. But, during his
administration, George W. Bush encouraged policies directed toward reducing
(and ultimately eradicating) prostitution as a part of the United States' efforts
Jo Doezema, "Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution
Dichotomy," in Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition, eds. Kamala Kempadoo and
Jo Doezema (New York: Routledge, 1998), 37, 41-47. See also Larissa Sandy, "Just Choices:
Representations of Choice and Coercion in Sex Work in Cambodia," The Australian Journal of
Anthropology 18, no. 2 (August, 2007): 194-206.
191 Wendy Murphy and Kat Smith, interview by John Stossel, The John Stossel Show, Fox
Business News, March 4, 2010, http://www.iswface.org/ (accessed 1 May 2010).
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against human trafficking/'^ These efforts reflected both evangelical and
feminist fears about the normalization of prostitution in society/'^
The final pillar on which the redefinitional narrative stands is the moral
imperative to acquiesce to what sex workers themselves want�or at least what
the advocates of this narrative say they want. The imperative has several sources.
First, since the late 1960s, American feminist theory has been deeply concerned
with listening to all women's voices. Both black and lesbian feminists offered
sharp criticisms of traditional white and "heterosexist" feminism; criticisms
which white feminists have accepted.^'^ Kempadoo, Doezema, Murray and other
sex worker advocates want "conventional feminists" to listen to the voices of sex
workers, rather than pass moral judgments on them. Murray put it this way:
Support of sex workers' rights is part of a larger post-modern challenge to
conventional feminism, which allows for a cacophony of voices and
refuses the binary dichotomy in which all women are constituted as
"other." Feminism which fails to overcome binary oppositions ends up
supporting the status quo, impoverishing women and aligning with right-
wing fundamentalism and a discourse which has its genesis in
homophobia.^'^
"2 Anthony M. DeStefano, The War on Human Trafficking: U.S. Policy Assessed (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 110-117.
Ronald Weitzer, "The Movement to Criminalize Sex Work in the United States,"
Journal of Law and Society 37, no. 1 (March 2010), 64.
i''' See Josephine Donovan, Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions, 3"^ ed. (New York:
Continuum, 2000), 169ff.
Murray, "Debt-Bondage and Trafficking: Don't BeUeve the Hype," 52.
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According to Murray and others, feminism betrays its roots when it pronounces
what is best for the "other." The moral imperative is further reinforced by a
commitment to cultural relativity. Telling sex workers that prostituting
themselves is bad is yet another way elites exercise power over the marginalized.
Even distinguishing between relatively well-to-do prostitutes in the West and
desperately poor prostitutes in the developing world exemplifies a colonial
mentality. Consequently, sex worker advocates applaud sex worker
organizations in the developing world. Finally, to suggest that consensual sex
has limits is inherently oppressive. On what philosophical grounds can we forbid
consensual commercial sex but retain the right to every other kind of consensual
sex? Asking us to discipline ourselves in this one respect is inconsistent.
The end result is that sex worker advocates reject both the idea of
victimhood and the need for rescue. Instead, sex workers need to stand up for
their own right to work as they desire (in the trade or out of it), and we ought to
offer our resources to help them. While being a victim might remove the moral
stigma of prostitution, it adds the moral stigma of passivity as well as ensuring
that those who choose sex work will continue to suffer ostracism. Accordingly,
no moral judgments ought to be made about sex workers at all; moral judgment
harms, de-means, and separates the sex worker from society. Thus, in the
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redefinitional narrative, salvation comes from letting sex workers work in safe
environments, free of abuse, shame or guilt.
While sex worker advocates have primarily attacked anti-prostitution
feminists, 1"^^ one scholar has specifically criticized the Christian mission to
prostitutes in Thailand from the redefinitional perspective. Darla Y. Schumm
analyzed the Christian missionary response to prostitution in Thailand in her
2002 doctoral dissertation. She focused on four different mission organizations
working directly with prostitutes: the Fatima Center, a Catholic refuge run by the
Good Shepherd Sisters; New Life Center, a residential project for tribal girls
whose first director was Lauran Bethell (now based in Amsterdam); Rahab
Ministries, a holistic mission to prostitutes founded by Patricia Green (now with
Alabaster Jar, a ministry to prostitutes in Berlin); and Empower, a secular
advocacy organization co-founded with Mennonite Max Ediger (now in Hanoi).
She found that the Christian missions practiced a variety of strategies, including
prevention, conversion, rescue, rehabilitation, education and empowerment.^'^
Schumm had two basic criticisms of the Christian mission to prostitutes in
Thailand. First, she believed most of them to be "Orientalist," by which she
See, for example, Jo Doezema, "Ouch! Western Feminists' 'Wounded Attachment' to
the 'Third World Prostitute,'" Feminist Review 67 (Spring 2001): 16-38.
Darla Y. Schumm, "The Self-Understanding of the Christian Missionary Movement on
Prostitution in Thailand: A Critical Analysis (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 2002), 159.
Schumm is now a professor of religion at Hollins University in Roanoke, Virginia.
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means they believe Western Christian culture to be superior to Thai culture. For
example, she declared that "Rahab most obviously promotes the belief that, via
Christianity, the West has a responsibility to lead Asia into modernity and that
the cultures of the Orient are therefore inferior to Western culture."^'* Even when
missions try to contextualize Christianity in the local culture, they still "maintain
that Christianity should be spread throughout the world, which implies that
non-Christian religions are inferior and should be replaced by Christianity."^''
Schumm made it clear that she agrees with the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's
suggestion that "it is best for people to adhere to the religious tradition of their
upbringing" and "that all religious traditions have value and worth." She did
recognize that Christians would need to re-examine what it means to be a
Christian missionary if they "embraced this one simple truth that the Dalai Lama
asserts."^� Of course, her hope that Christians would follow the suggestions of
the Buddhist Dalai Lama rather than the commands of Christ betrays another
sort of cultural imperialism, a hypocrisy about which she seems oblivious.
More helpful, perhaps, was her observation regarding the continued
difficulties in contextualizing the gospel for the Thai culture. This is not a new





Thailand, described how "noisy" the Christian gospel seemed to Thai Buddhists
and how disturbing was God's wrath in a culture that valued tranquility .^"^
Certainly, these and other aspects of the faith were and are stumbling blocks for
Thais. But by accusing the missionaries of Orientalism, Schumm actually
obscured rather than clarified the Christian missionaries' sd/-understanding�
her purported goal. First, she completely overlooked the tension between
Christianity and the West and instead conflated the two. That both Bethell and
Green are now working with prostitutes in Europe by applying lessons learned
from their experiences in Thailand suggests a more nuanced relationship
between Christianity, the West and Thailand. Moreover, Schumm failed to factor
in the culture of prostitution, though she did claim to recognize the prostitute to
be the "other of the other." But Christian missionaries to prostitutes such as
Green are very aware of the cultural barriers�not only between the West and
the local culture, but between the local culture and prostitute cultures.^"^ Of
course, the Christian missionaries do believe that women and children can have
a better life outside of the sex trade, and, in a sense, this means they believe that
prostitution culture is inferior to their own; yet, even Schumm agrees that the sex
201 Kosuke Koyama, Waterbujfalo Theology (MaryknoU, N.Y.: Orbis, 1974), 95-96, 225-226.
202 Patricia Green, email message to author, 17 June 2009.
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trade in Thailand is a "serious social problem/'^os Third, whereas Schumm
seemed unimpressed with the friendship evangelism of the Christian
missionaries, I know of no better way to overcome attitudes of cultural
superiority than through friendship. In good friendships, all parties change and
grow. As the Anglican clergyman from India, V. S. Azariah, proclaimed to the
1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, the people of India needed
more than good works and heroic labor from Western missionaries: "We also ask
for love. Give us FRIENDS! "^"^ Christian missionaries can only share who they are.
To expect Western missionaries to be something they are not is to diminish the
possibility of true friendship and inter-cultural dialogue. And while Schumm did
find some signs of condescension among Western missionaries, her study did not
suggest that this attitude was prevalent among them. Ultimately it seems that
Schumm was criticizing the Western missionaries for being Western and
missionaries� \hd� is, for thinking they have found something worth sharing with
others. Schumm acknowledged that the modern sex trade in Thailand is, in part,
a Western creation, but it is the Western Christian efforts to redress the trade that
Schumm, 114.
204 V. S. Azariah, Address delivered 20 June 1910 on "The Problem of Co-operation
betw^een Foreign and Native Workers," in World Missionary Conference, 1910, The History and
Records of the Conference Together with Addresses Delivered at the Evening Meetings (Edrnburg and
London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier; and New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell
Company, n.d. [1910]), 315.
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are imperialistic! While Christian missionaries to prostitutes can no doubt be
patronizing, ultimately, Schumm's criticisms seem unjustified. Schumm, too, is a
Westerner with a Western plan to alleviate the sufferings of sex workers in the
Western-sponsored Thai sex trade, and, unlike the missionaries she encountered
there, she does not actually know any Thai prostitutes.^o^
Schumm also chided the Christian mission to prostitutes for not accepting
the redefinitional salvation narrative. More specifically, she argued that for any
mission to be effective, its work must include situational, structural and
redefinitional approaches to mitigating the problems of prostitution. Generally,
Schumm credited the missions with providing situational assistance for some
women, though she sees these as "'band aids' to deeper problems.''^"^ She was
not as positive toward the missions' structural efforts to address the sex trade
and believed these to be ineffective precisely "because... their adherence to a
Western Christian perspective" keeps them from engaging "in the deep
structural critiques and transformations necessary to realize true economic and
205Schumm, 41-43, 220.
Ibid., 2. Schumm: "While I argue throughout the dissertation that the most effective
response to prostitution in Thailand must take the necessary step of incorporating the voices of
Thai prostitutes, this study does not ultimately take that step. The primary task of this study is to
assess the efficacy of the Christian missionary response to prostitution in Thailand and to
demonstrate the necessity and create the space for the voices of Thai prostitutes. Nevertheless, I
must be clear in stating that I recognize the seeming contradiction between my assertions and the
focus of the dissertation, and that I do not intend to repeat the patterns of Orientalism I critique
by not including the voices of Thai prostitutes."
207 Ibid., 231.
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legal reform or the radically altering cultural empowerment of Thai women/'^o^
Of course, the missions would no doubt like to see Thailand and the global sex
trade radically transformed by Christianity, but I suspect that is not the sort of
transformation Schumm believes is feasible. Finally, Schumm, not surprisingly,
found the missions opposed to the legitimization of prostitution. Only Empower
advocates "that sex work is real work," but since Empower is now a secular
organization, Schumm dismissed its relevance in her evaluation.^"' Schumm
contended that "moral reasoning about sex work and sex workers must go
beyond ethical concerns regarding the sexual immorality of prostitution to an
expanded social ethical concern that stresses the empowerment of the
personhood of Thai prostitutes and acts to improve the working conditions and
human rights of Thai sex workers."^" Since the Christian missions see the sex
trade as evil and believe "that the majority of Thai prostitutes are coerced into
the sex industry," they fail to participate in a salvation story that would make the







Sex worker advocates and critics of the Christian and feminist missions to
prostitutes have done some thoughtful analysis from which we may learn. They
are certainly right to warn about the danger in treating prostitutes as objects
without a voice of their own. Not every prostitute wants to leave prostitution. In
fact, prostitution is an exceedingly complex phenomenon that resists
generalizations. One way anti-prostitution activists may objectify prostitutes is
by focusing on the most horrendous stories in trying to gain sympathy for the
cause. We are all fascinated by other people's pain, but, unless we actually do
something to help others, stories of sexual slavery become a sort of perverse
entertainment. We must be careful that we do not encourage a sort of Christian
voyeurism that further victimizes real people.
Another danger revealed by sex worker advocates is an overreliance on
legal remedies and a carelessness of thought regarding how the law promotes or
limits the human rights of prostitutes as well as their ability to leave the trade.
New Zealand decriminalized prostitution in 2003 and found in its 2008 review of
the law that, though safety concerns persisted, most prostitutes felt safer and
were more likely to report abuse to the police. The number of prostitutes did not
increase.^" By decriminalizing prostitution. New Zealand hoped to keep
212 New Zealand Prostitution Law Review Committee, Rq^ort of the Prostitution Law
Review Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of
Justice, 2008), 13-14.
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prostitution from going underground, and thus make it easier to help prostitutes
leave the trade as well as improve working conditions for those women who
remained in it. So far this approach seems to be having the desired effect, though
the review committee reported "little dedicated support for those wishing to exit
the sex industry."^" Such a legal regime might make it easier for Christian
missions to prostitutes to reach out to prostitutes, and so possesses some
advantages. Rather than simply asserting that decriminalization or legalization
of prostitution is always harmful to prostitutes or society. Christians and
feminists should give more careful thought to how the law might serve the
mission to protect those in the trade and assist them to leave it. One area of great
concern is how modern technology and legal repression have moved prostitution
indoors, especially in Europe and America, making it much more difficult for
others to reach or befriend prostitutes.^^^ Closed-door prostitution also removes it
from the public eye, allowing polite society to pretend it does not exist. This may
not be the direction we want to move. Prohibition has not made prostitution
unthinkable; perhaps creative interim decriminalization measures would be
useful in both reducing harm in the sex trade and creating more spaces for
Ibid., 15.
See Elizabeth Bernstein, Temporarily Yours: Intimacy, Authenticity, and the Commerce of
Sex (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2007).
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missions to prostitutes to help women leave the trade and ultimately make
prostitution unthinkable.
Despite these and other helpful criticisms and warnings, the fundamental
vision of the redefinitional salvation story is nonetheless deeply flawed, failing to
take evil seriously or give those opposing evil the courage they need to persevere
against it.
As I described earlier, when I was visiting a friend who is working against
the sex trade in Mexico, he took me into a brothel to show me what we were up
against. The brothel was hidden away and secured behind locked doors. My
friend told the woman at the desk that we were here for my bachelor party.
Three somewhat skeptical adult women came out and posed for us in their
clothes. Embarrassed and unable to even look at the women, I realized what it
meant to buy someone� and shuddered in horror for what it must mean to sell
oneself. Those women expected me to look at them as things, not as persons� to
choose one (or more) of them to use. The expectation� the fundamental
assumption� of prostitution is that I can buy someone for my own gratification.
In order to purchase sex, the customer must de-mean the prostitute. Moreover,
when a customer de-means a prostitute, he also de-means himself. Our own
humanity�our own meaning� can never be enhanced by de-meaning someone
else. Finally, the prostitute correspondingly sees the customer as a means to an
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end�and, in effect, de-means him as well. Prostitution is essentially de-meaning
and always will be. The de-meaning character of prostitution makes it evil. This
is why redefining prostitution as sex work fails to save anyone. Calling
prostitution "sex work" does not change its de-meaning character.
While decriminalization might very well be advantageous for both
prostitutes and the Christian missions to them, at least in some contexts, the
legitimization of prostitution is harmful. Legitimization comes when elites within
society interpret prostitution as a positive or neutral activity, and it seems to be
the desired goal of sex worker advocacy. The basic idea supposes that, if
consumers and bystanders thought of prostitutes as another type of professional
service worker, then prostitutes would accrue more respect and self-respect.
However, since prostitution is inherently de-meaning, this is simply not possible.
One cannot disrespect a person by buying them for one's own gratification and
at the same time respect them. Instead, legitimization makes it morally
permissible for people to buy sex and thus de-mean people. It is not healthy for
the society or the individuals involved.
Sex worker advocates believe that the buying and selling of sex is like the
buying and selling of any other service and is thus morally good. They argue that
we have a moral obligation to give the sex workers what they (supposedly)
want� safe working conditions and moral approbation. Logically, moral praise
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ought to be extended to the customer and pimp, as well. What the redefinitional
narrative fails to do, however, is provide any moral foundation for moral praise
besides the fact of human agency. The fundamental assumption is that sexual
libertinism is good for individuals and for all societies. To think otherwise is to
deserve moral condemnation as "moralists" or "puritans." But it is not enough to
simply insult one's opponents. How exactly does sexual libertinism benefit all
people and cultures? Why ought commercial sex be morally acceptable? How
does this cultural hegemony avoid the very criticisms of universalism it makes of
other moral systems? People simply do not agree that everyone ought to do what
is good in their own eyes. The philosophy of moral relativism which undergirds
sex worker advocacy does not offer a way to justify its moral imperatives, and so
the redefinitional salvation narrative simply becomes another universalist
narrative among many. Sex worker advocates also exclude voices� for example,
the voices of former prostitutes who have converted to Christianity and now see
the sex trade for the evil that it is.
The commodification of sex promotes a body-mind dualism that is
harmful to women. To view one's body as something that one uses and one can
sell is to alienate oneself from one's own body. But because our bodies are an
integral part of who we are, this dualistic attitude has the effect of de-meaning
ourselves. It makes us less human when we buy and sell our bodies because we
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treat the human body as if it was a thing rather than a real person. Moreover, as
feminist scholars have pointed out, dualism tends to promote the subjugation of
women by associating them with the body�which is consistently less valued
than the mind.^" Legitimizing the sale of women's and children's bodies will do
nothing to liberate them.
Do we really want a world where everything is for sale? Has the
commodification of all aspects of life in our society been a blessing for us? Must
everything have a price tag? Redefining prostitution as sex work is culturally
imperialistic. It represents the globalization of consumerism taken to the
uttermost. This has already occurred to an extent, of course� I've heard of a case
where infants were being prostituted in Central America. If we already live in a
world where men can buy sexual experiences with babies, we need to ask
ourselves if legitimizing the purchase and sale of sexual intimacy is the right
direction for our society and every society.
Sex worker advocates criticize anti-prostitution activists for hypocritically
focusing on prostitution when other forms of labor are also abusive. This is not a
fair criticism. De-meaning prostitutes is similar to other de-meaning forms of
labor. The most obvious example is slavery� a system of labor which turns a
human into property. Substantial and widespread anecdotal evidence indicates
215 See Noddings, 26-27, 36ff.
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that many women and children are held in slavery as prostitutes. Moreover, the
history of slavery in the United States (and elsewhere) certainly demonstrates the
readiness of masters to sexually abuse or use their slaves. Sex tourism depends
on master-slave fantasies of the relatively well-to-do Western tourist who will
"sometimes rationalize their visits to the Caribbean for sex as a way to benefit the
poor, oppressed women," while denying "exploitative aspects of their
relationship."2" But the modern anti-slavery movement, led by organizations
such as Not for Sale, is not merely concerned with eliminating sexual slavery, but
all forms of slavery. Nor does feminist or Christian concern for prostitutes
preclude concern for labor exploitation, though any individual's or
organization's efforts to help marginalized and exploited people are going to be
limited by time and energy and focusing efforts on one group is not
unreasonable.
Another key component of the redefinitional narrative is the idea that
very few people are forced or tricked into the sex trade. Extensive anecdotal and
statistical data indicate otherwise. Moreover, many women really do feel like
2w Kemala Kempadoo, Sexing the Caribbean: Gender, Race, and Sexual Labor (New York:
Routledge, 2004), 123-124.
For example, see Brock and Thistlethwaite; Clarke; DeStefano; Glenny; McGill; Stark
and Whisnant; Melissa Farley et al., "Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update
on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder," in Prostitution, Trafficking, and Traumatic Stress,
ed. Melissa Farley (Haworth Press, 2003); Dawn Herzog Jewell, Escaping the Devil's Bedroom: Sex
Trafficking, Global Prostitution and the Gospel's Transforming Power (Oxford: Monarch Books, 2008);
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prostitution is their only viable option because of their poverty or other
constricting circumstances. Yet advocates of sex worker "rights," accuse anti-
prostitution activists of racism and neo-colonialism for their efforts to liberate
women from the trade. Kempadoo, for example describes feminist Kathleen
Barry's work on trafficking as a "colonial...mission to rescue those whom she
considered to be incapable of self-determination."^" In fact, Kempadoo believes
that anti-trafficking activists align with global capitalists when they describe
prostitutes of developing nations "as incapable of making decisions about their
own lives, forced by overwhelming external powers completely beyond their
control into submission and slavery." The irony of accusing feminist anti-
trafficking scholars of being in bed with global capitalists while at the same time
promoting a world where everything can be bought and sold seems lost on
Kempadoo. More frightening, perhaps, is the denial of constricting forces on
women's and children's lives that lead them to choose prostitution. Ultimately
Kempadoo and others are suggesting that it is perfectly fine for poor women of
Soane Malia Pulotu, "Prostitutes Talk of God," Melanesian Journal of Theology 21:1 (2005): 84-91; E.
Benjamin Skinner, A Crime So Monstrous: Face-to-Face with Modern-Day Slavery (New York: Free
Press, 2009); Louisa Waugh, Selling Olga: Stories ofHuman Trafficking and Resistance (London:
Phoenix, 2006); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons
(February 2009); and United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (June 2009).
My own personal conversations with prostitutes and former prostitutes in the developing world
also support the contention that prostitution is a tiap that harms women.
Kempadoo, "Introduction: Globalizing Sex-Workers Rights," 11-12.
219 Ibid., 12.
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color to be bought and sold and, if one disagrees with this state of affairs, then
one is a racist neo-colonialist!
Finally, sex worker advocates are unduly fascinated with the idea of
"agency." Self-determination is, of course, a Western value and encouraging it
characterizes the modern Western scholarly community. But recognition of
marginalized people's autonomy ought not to obscure the forces that conspire to
trap them in de-meaning circumstances. Everyone has choices, and everyone has
social constraints. No one is perfectly free to define themselves independent of
others. Critics of the anti-trafficking movement assume that if someone is a
"victim," then she cannot have agency.^^" But this is a category error; one is a
victim because one suffers de-meaning evil, not because one has lost agency.
Those trying to help prostitutes leave the sex trade know that leaving the sex
trade is a difficult personal choice precisely because of the social constraints these
women face. Poverty, fear, the lack of an education, a history of sexual abuse, a
drug or alcohol dependency, or poor coping skills do not negate a woman's
agency, but they certainly do limit her freedom. Ultimately, redefining
prostitution as work is redefining slavery as freedom. When a woman continues
to participate in her own self-destruction, she needs help in ending her
participation, not encouragement in continuing it. Victims of abuse often need
See, for example, Sandy, 195.
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counseling to help them resist self-destructive responses; we should not confuse
a coping mechanism�an attempt to resist de-meaning�with true freedom. Of
course, we must listen to the women in the trade, and we need to respect their
choices, but that is not the same as providing moral sanction for their acceptance
of their defeat.
The language of rights is sometimes used to defend the concept of sex
work. Certainly all people, including prostitutes, have both inherent rights�
such as the right to the respect owed due to their infinite worth�and socially
conferred rights� such as the right to police protection. Yet prostitutes do not
have the "right" to engage in sex work. This is because work that is essentially
de-meaning, both to the prostitute and to the consumer, runs counter to the
inherent right to respect we share as humans loved by God. Those three women
who posed before me in that brothel were daughters of God, beloved by God.
Even for me to gaze on them as things would be disrespectful, de-meaning and
would violate their inherent human rights. Of course, police also need to respect
prostitutes for the very same reasons I must, and this means take seriously their
obligation to protect them, even if prostitution is illegal. Moreover, abuse at the
hands of police� such as demanding sex in lieu of paying a fine� is also a clear
violation of human rights. Sex worker advocates are right to raise awareness of
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these and other human rights issues, but their case for the right to work as a
prostitute cannot be sustained.
Certainly the redefinitional narrative is appealing to many people. It
requires little of the average person while allowing the male consumer of sex to
feel morally superior to all of the anti-sex puritan activists. Legitimizing sex
work does not save anyone; rather, it consigns far too many women, children
and men to the dangers and degradations of prostitution. Prostitution is
destructive to all involved� it turns intimate organs into commodities and
people into things. Redefining prostitutionwill not change its fundamental de
meaning quality. It does not take evil seriously and offers little reason to oppose
it. It will no doubt remain a popular narrative, but the women, men and children
trapped in prostitution deserve a better story.
The Christian gospel offers a better story. Evil is taken seriously�
Christians do not need to deny the realities that conspire to trap people in
prostitution, nor do they deny an individual's agency. In fact. Christians
recognize that sometimes an individual's acts may promote their own self-
destruction or the destruction of others. Rather than encouraging destructive acts
to continue, Jesus invites sinners to "go and sin no more."^^ Moreover,
Christians proclaim hope for a better life. Through the power of the Holy Spirit,
John 8:11.
people really may know happiness and experience healing (re-meaning), no
matter what their present circumstances. The proof of the story is in the living� a
faithful response to the invitation to enter into the life of Christ really does
transform people and can heal them from horrendous evils. As I argued in the
third chapter, this healing is a reality in the life of my friend Leslie and many
other victims of evil. While a comprehensive soteriology is beyond the scope of
this essay, I do wish to suggest four emphases that the sex trade reveals
regarding our salvation story.
The first emphasis is on the need for rescue. No one likes to be rescued�
we would rather be the rescuer. Being rescued does not deserve praise nor does
it boost self-esteem. In fact, quite the opposite is true� not needing others is
morally praiseworthy, at least in Western society. Advocates for sex workers
make it quite clear that not every prostitute wants to be rescued, and they
consider trying to rescue someone against their will to be morally blameworthy
as well as ineffective. Yet, the Christian gospel teaches that salvation is
dependent upon God rescuing us. Though people are expected to participate in
their own salvation, humanity is nonetheless entirely dependent upon the grace
of God. The psalms� the church's prayer book� teach an attitude of dependence
to those who pray them. The prayer that Jesus taught his disciples is an excellent
summary of the psalms in this respect. In it, we ask God to reign over us, to give
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us our daily bread, to forgive us our sins, to keep us from temptation and to
deliver us from evil.222 The process of asking for these things teaches us the
proper relation we have with God�that is, that we desperately need him and are
wholly dependent upon him. Contrary to critical opinion, we do not seek to
become rescuers because it makes us feel good about ourselves, but because we
have been rescued too, and we want to share the great gift we have discovered with
others. In the clash with competing narratives, others might find comfort in
refusing to think of themselves as needing God or others, but we nonetheless
must live the good news that has been given to us: God loves us; we need God.
What we discover as we live out this truth is that it works. God is faithful in
keeping his promises.
The second emphasis is on the power of God to transform lives. The
secular academy is not lacking wisdom in its efforts to promote people's healing.
To take one example, consider Judith Lewis Herman's Trauma and Recovery.
Herman found parallels between the trauma incurred at the hands of domestic
abuse and public political terror. She rightly taught that healing must occur in
the context of relationships and follows three stages: safety, remembrance and
mourning, and reconnection.^^s The Christianmission to prostitutes does well to
222 Matthew 6:9-13.
223 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (Basic Books, 1992), 133, 155.
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mine the riches of this secular wisdom. But we also have something to offer that
Herman and others do not have: a relationship with God who is able to save.
Because we must own our salvation, our healing and recovery will not be
magical or quick, but we can trust that God is for us and with us. We have
always proclaimed and claimed the power of the resurrection for the healing of
the world. Often and sometimes to our surprise, this power works concretely to
heal people. The gospels portray Christ as a healer, and the reign of God he
armounces is one where healing breaks through and transforms our lives. We
have, perhaps, no greater practical wisdom than anyone else, but we do testify to
the healing and transforming power of God in Christ at work in our lives, in our
churches and in the world.
Another emphasis of the salvation story that the sex trade reveals to us is
the power of the gospel to overcome shame. In the modern West, we tend to
favor a gospel of the forgiveness of sins over a gospel of honor for the shamed.
But, of course, the gospel is both. Given the social ostracism felt by most
prostitutes, as well as their frequent victimization, we do not need to make
prostitutes feel bad. Proper guilt comes in time and forgiveness is near at hand,
but what a prostitute needs is to be honored for the child of God he or she is. The
Christian story has long held a different ethic of honor than the cultures it seeks
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to transform.224 The Christian mission to prostitutes needs to live this out by
modeling how prostituted people can trade their shame in for honor within
communities of grace. To this, we look to Jesus. Whenever anyone tried to shame
Jesus, the shame was reflected back on to him, and when anyone sought his
healing touch, their shame melted into honor.^ By welcoming prostitutes into
our churches and homes and valuing them for the people they are, we give them
another message than the one they hear on the street. It is not enough for the
missionaries to prostitutes to convey this message; the entire church needs to
support it too. For too many Christians in the pews, a prostitute symbolizes sin
and degradation. If we are to truly welcome and honor them�and thus promote
their healing, then we need to see them as Jesus sees them: not as things, but as
people, beloved by God.
Finally, I want to emphasize that prostitutes have a special place in the
Christian story. Much of this comes from Judaism, where prostitutes like Rahab
are portrayed as women of faith and Israel is sometimes symbolized as a
prostitute who is nonetheless loved by God. The Gospels reinforce this emphasis
by making specific mention of Jesus' ancestor Rahab and other shamed
See David A. deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament
Culture (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), especially chapters one and two.
225 See, for example, Luke 8:40-48. In effect, every healing and exorcism also removed
shame.
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women.226 "Loose women" are not turned away by Jesus, but rather are healed
and blessed by him. In medieval church tradition, Mary the Magdalene was
taken to be a prostitute, though there is very little biblical evidence for it.^^
Similarly, the woman at the well who, according to John, becomes one of the first
to proclaim the good news of the coming of Christ, has long been connected with
the shame of sexual sin, though it does not seem that she was a prostitute.^^
Regardless of the historical facts, the church has cherished Jesus' mercy and
kindness toward prostitutes and other shamed women and has a long tradition
of using their stories as models of conversion and grace for the edification of the
whole church.
One of those stories involved Maria, the niece of Abraham, a monk of the
desert. Maria had been left in the care of Abraham as a child, and he raised her to
be a holy woman of God. But a wayward monk tempted her to give up her
virginity. In guilt and shame, she forsook the desert and embraced prostitution.
After some years, Abraham tracked her down and went to visit her, disguised as
226 Matthew 1:3,5.
227 She was a demoniac (Luke 8:2), which might imply prostitution. See Benedicta Ward,
Harlots of the Desert: A Study in Repentance in Early Monastic Sources (Kalamazoo: Cistercian
Publications, 1987), lOff. Ward beheves she comes to represent unfaithfulness, and, through
God's grace, a new Eve. But it was a short step from symbolic xmfaithfulness to prostitute.
228 John 4:1-42.
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a soldier. When they were alone, he revealed himself to her and then pleaded for
her salvation:
After a while she plucked up courage and, weeping, she said to him, T
could not come to you; I was so very much ashamed. How can I pray
again to God when I am defiled with sin which is as filthy as this?' The
holy man said to her, 'Upon me be your sin, Maria, and let God lay it to
my account. Only listen to me and come, let us go back to where we
belong. See, our dearest Ephraim is grieving so much for you and he is
praying all the time for you to the Lord. My dear, do not draw back from
the mercy of God. To you, your sins seem like mountains, but God has
spread his mercy over all that He has made. So we once read together how
an unclean woman came to the Lord and he did not send her away but
cleansed her, and she washed his feet with her tears and wiped them with
the hairs of her head. If sparks could set fire to the ocean, then indeed
your sins could defile the purity of God! It is not new to fall, my daughter;
what is wrong is to lie down when you have fallen.^^^
This plea becomes a plea for all of us. Are we really so different from Maria? Do
we not all fall? Do we not all feel shame? See, the church is a church of
prostitutes. We all need it to be a place of mercy, and that is why we must never
forsake the mission to prostitutes.
In this chapter, I have sought to reflect briefly on how the problem of evil
informs our ethical response to the sex trade. Evil is a practical problem of
making sense of people's de-meaned lives. The sex trade exemplifies this process
in all of its aspects: the sin, the shame, the slavery, the need for the mercy of God.
The Christian mission to prostitutes has critics who, in the end, want to keep the
Ward, 98.
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world much the way it already is. But we have a better story to tell: a story of
grace, hope and healing. May we never tire of its telling.
X- =(� *
I realize that to define evil as de-meaning is to define it in a very Christian
way. Moreover, my claim that meaning must be relational and eternal is
thoroughly Christian. Those readers that concur with this claim are likely
Christians (or almost Christians) already. It is certainly possible to deny that evil
is essentially de-meaning or that meaning must be relational and eternal, but I
think that to do so impoverishes us and would lead ultimately to despair or
indifference if we did not often live better than we believe. In short, contrary to
the arguments of atheists and others, I find the Christian response to evil to be
deeply satisfying intellectually and emotionally. By this, I do not mean that faith
in God is easy or always results in what I want. In fact, it propels me to take a
stand against evil� in my case, the sex trade� in ways thatwill cost me greatly.
This work represents more than a year of thought and reflection. Like
some of my prayers, I have sometimes been startled by what I said. It may be
that in my hesitant and stammering reply to the divine voice in my life I have not
always spoken rightly about God, but God is my heart's desire, and so I trust in
his grace to overlook and forgive any fault of mine. It seems most fitting to
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conclude with a prayer, both for myself and for all of those whose lives are
threatened by horrendous evil:
But may all who seek you rejoice and be glad in you;
may those who love your salvation say continually, "Great is the
Lord!"
As for me, I am poor and needy,
but the Lord takes thought for me.
You are my help and my deliverer;
do not delay, O my God.
Psalm 40:16-17 NRSV
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